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S TOCKHOLDERS'

class suits, derivative or representative, cannot be
dismissed or compromised without court approval and notice to the

class; Federal Rule 23 (c)."' The first part of this Article' has considered
the history and purpose of the Rule, the types of stockholder proceedings
to which it applies, and the dismissal of stockholder litigation. The present
discussion deals with the settlement proper.
The normal course of the settlement proceedings is fairly stereotyped.
Once the compromise is negotiated and reduced to writing, it is submitted
to the court for its approval. The court sets a hearing date and directs
that all shareholders be notified; it may order a preliminary hearing before
a referee. At the hearing all interested persons may offer their evidence
in support of the settlement or in opposition to it. The court approves the
settlement if it is in the best interest of the class or corporation. The
judgment of approval is subject to review on appeal; unless reversed it
binds the class or corporation as res judicata. Despite their apparent simplicity, these steps may at each stage involve peculiar problems, and they
are enhanced at times by anomalies such as collateral attacks on the compromise or attempted settlements out of court.
V.

THE PARTIES TO THE SETTLEMENT

The compromise of a derivative action involves, as a rule, three sets of
parties: the complaining stockholder or stockholders, the "beneficiary"
Is FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c). As a result of the 1966 amendment, the substance of the Rule is
now found in new Rule 23(e), governing representative class suits, and in the last sentence of new
Rule 23.1, governing stockholders' derivative suits. References herein to the old Rule 23 or 23(c)

include the amended Rules unless the context indicates otherwise. For corresponding state statutes
and rules, and for the pertinent legal literature, see Part I of this Article, Haudek, The Settlement
and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part 1, 22 Sw. L.J. 767 (1968), at notes 3, 4 and 12.
154 Haudek, supra note 153.
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corporation in whose behalf the action is brought, and the "real" defendants (often, but not necessarily, the directors of the corporation). There
is, of course, no "beneficiary" corporation in a representative suit."'
The Complaining Stockholder and His Lawyer. Normally the task of ne-

gotiating a compromise with the defendants falls to the stockholderplaintiff and his lawyer. In settling the claims of the class or corporation
they dispose of other people's property. Vested with this power, they are
under the fiduciary duty to use it in the best interest of those they represent.""

Although the stockholder-plaintiff is a self-appointed representative, he
is permitted to act for the class if he will fairly and adequately represent
its interests. Adequate representation is required as a matter of constitu-

tional due process," 7 and Rule 23 makes the requirement explicit.' Even
a single plaintiff owning but a few shares can be an adequate representative
and sue on behalf of a large class or corporation; this has long been recognized in derivative suits, 1 9 has now been established for representative
actions as well, "° and is in keeping with the purpose of class suits to afford
protection to small claimants"' by enabling them to secure the services of
competent counsel."8 '
Once a class action is commenced, the stockholder-plaintiffs themselves,
whether one or many, large or small, can contribute little to its effective

prosecution, since the conduct of the litigation lies in the hands of the
plaintiff's lawyer. The adequacy of the class representation depends, therefore, in large measure on the lawyer's integrity, skill and industry,' and
"'.See id. at notes 5-11.
"' The class plaintiff is a fiduciary: Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330
U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947); Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1945); Denicke v. Anglo
Cal. Nat'l Bank, 141 F.2d 285, 288 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944); Miller v.
Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164,
175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd en banc, 340 F.2d 311 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed sub norn. Holt v. Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966); Whitten v.
Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 P. 312 (1915); Ensher v. Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, 187 Cal.
App. 2d 407, 410, 9 Cal. Rptr. 732, 734 (1960); Tenney v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 209, 160
N.E.2d 463, 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158, 162 (1959); Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 149, 71
N.E.2d 443, 444 (1947); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 144 P.2d 725 (1944); Note,
Fiduciary Capacity of Plaintiff in Stockholders' Derivative Suit, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 684 (1947);
Note, Extension of Fiduciary Duties in Settlement of Derivative Suits: A Footnote to Young v.
Higbee, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 429 (1948). See also Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at note 13.
"'Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
58FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), 23.1, as amended.
"' Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1947); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 318 (1936); Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d
753, 761 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955).
'Green
v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969);
Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1968); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968); Weisman v. MCA Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 262 (D.
Del. 1968); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 493-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
...Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966); Escott v. Barchris Constr.
Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816
(1965); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cit. 1941); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Advisory Comm. Notes of 1966 to Federal Rule 23, 39
F.R.D. 104 (1966).
"..Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035
(1967).
... Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968); Meighan v. American
Grass Twine Co., 154 F. 346, 347 (2d Cir. 1907) (in derivative suit, stockholder's attorney may
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this is clearly true in the negotiation of a compromise. It is, therefore, the

complaining stockholder's lawyer to whom the class must look for effective
protection in the settlement negotiations. " He is, indeed, powerfully motivated to fulfill this expectation. As an economic matter, his compensation, to be awarded by the court out of the recovery, depends on the success of the action and is more or less commensurate with the amount of
the recovery.'0 ' While in very large cases the financial incentive to achieve
optimal results may be somewhat lessened,'" lawyers are also guided by the
ethical standards of their profession, by pride of achievement, an "instinct
of workmanship" and a regard for their professional reputation. By and
large, therefore, the stockholder's lawyer, if otherwise competent, is well
qualified to afford the class adequate representation in the settlement of
the action.
Multiple Plaintiffs. The institution of a stockholder's action is often the
signal for other shareholders to intervene in the suit or to bring similar
actions of their own."7 If the several actions are in the same court, they
are usually consolidated,"'8 and the court appoints a "general counsel" to
take primary charge of the prosecution of the action. 0' Consolidation does
not, however, occur invariably even if the actions are in the same court,
and there can be no consolidation if the suits, as frequently happens, are
in different jurisdictions.' 0 The multiple plaintiffs-original, intervening,
be regarded as representing the corporation); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496-97
(E.D.N.Y.
1968).
04
' Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed, No.
23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956); Fistel v. Christman,
133 F. Supp. 300, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
165Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527
(1881); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Forty Wall St. Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 118, 213 N.Y.S.2d
689, 692-93 (1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 679, 180 N.E.2d 909, 225 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1962). The
mechanics of compensation are the same whether the recovery is achieved by judgment or settlement. Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959); Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224
F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1955). The rate of compensation depends on numerous circumstances, Angoff
v. Goldfine, supra at 188-89. See generally Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative
Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1939); Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 574, 587 (1942); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-17, 24-30 (1947); Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. REv. 658 (1956); Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894, 905
(1963); Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 580 (1955); Annot., 152 A.L.R. 909 (1944).
...The lawyer "is naturally biased by a self-interest
in securing as largean amount from the
defendant . . . as possible."
Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Mass. 1958). But
as pointed out by Judge Friendly in Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964)
(dissenting opinion), aff'd en banc, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed sub nom. Holt
v. Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966), a lawyer's fee percentage is often reduced as the recovery
passes the million dollar mark. The lawyer might then be tempted to take a quick fee for, say,
a million dollar settlement rather than gamble for a higher recovery in return for a relatively
modest increase of his fee. Yielding to this temptation would be plainly improper. Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 299 F.2d 449, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
...See Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at note 139; Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 562 (1960).
'68FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
5
's MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958). The order appointing the general counsel usually authorizes him to issue and receive all papers in the action, to initiate motions and to
conduct the pretrial discovery and the trial. The other lawyers for the plaintiffs are entitled to be
informed of the proceedings, to be consulted and to participate in them under the supervision of
the court. See, e.g., Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 44 F.R.D. 543, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
...See Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at note 139. Thus the settlement in Pergament v.
Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 17 (E.D. Mich. 1950), aff'd sub nora. Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d
315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953), involved six stockholders' actions brought in
five jurisdictions.
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consolidated and unconsolidated-may think very differently about the
wisdom of a compromise.
Does the settlement require the consent of all? The prevailing view gives
a negative answer,"' and rightly so. Compromises are favored by the
courts;1 72 the interests of the class or corporation rather than those of
individual plaintiffs control; 17 the grant of an absolute veto to each plaintiff would too often create an insuperable obstacle to the settlement. Nor
should the wishes of a majority of the plaintiffs decide; the uncohesive
and haphazardly constituted group of complainants does not invite the
use of democratic processes. On the other hand, it would be mischievous to
permit the defendants to pick their "softest" adversary for the negotiation
of a cheap compromise.' 4 If a general counsel has been appointed, the settlement should ordinarily be negotiated and concluded by him, since his
selection by the court gives some warrant for his skill and independence.'
He should consult the other lawyers in the consolidated action but is not
bound by their wishes.
The extent to which unconsolidated plaintiffs must be made parties to
the settlement presents greater difficulties. Normally, it would seem, the
consent of a single plaintiff to the compromise is enough to warrant the
judicial consideration of the settlement, provided that his conduct of the
litigation and other circumstances justify confidence in his efficiency and
integrity; but if another litigant was particularly successful and active,
his agreement should likewise be obtained or at least earnestly sought.'
The claim that a litigant was improperly excluded should be raised as an
...
Wolf v. Nazareth Enterprises, Inc., 303 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1962); Reiter v. Universal
Marion Corp., 299 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 273 F.2d 820
(D.C. Cir. 1960); Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed,
No. 23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956) (discussed at notes
176, 515-23 infra); Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716, 718-19 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd,
155 F.2d 773 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1946); Zenn v. Anzalone, 1 App. Div. 2d
662, 146 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1955); Naitove v. Morrow, New York Law Journal, Nov. 2, 1940, at
1386, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 1017, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1940); Bysheim v. Miranda, 44 N.Y.S.2d 15, 19, 22 (Sup. Ct. 1943). But see Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13,
19-20 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (exclusion of companion suit plaintiffs from settlement negotiations
was justified only by their hostile interests). On appeal, the dissenting judge condemned the exclusion, Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 323-24 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832
(1953), but the majority of the court affirmed, apparently on the ground that the course of the
negotiations was immaterial so long as the resulting compromise was fair. Id. at 330-31; see text
accompanying notes 186-88 infra.
172 See note 356 infra.
... Naitove v. Morrow, New York Law Journal, Nov. 2, 1940, at 1386, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 260 App. Div. 1017, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1940).
.. Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 323 (6th Cir.)

(dissenting opinion),

cert. denied,

346 U.S. 832 (1953); Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal
dismissed, No. 23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956).
'7 Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed, No.
23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956). See Rich v. Reisini,
25 App. Div. 2d 32, 266 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1966); Armstrong v. Doyle, 20 Misc. 2d 1087, 193
N.Y.S.2d 421, 423-24 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
176Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 403-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed,
No. 23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956), held that a state
court settlement would not be res judicata in a federal companion suit because the successful and
active federal plaintiffs had been excluded from the settlement negotiations. The federal plaintiffs'
involvement in a proxy fight with the defendant directors was held to afford no ground for settling
the case without them. For a further discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes 515-23
infra. But see Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 19-20 (E.D. Mich. 1950), aff'd sub noma.
Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953), discussed
at note 171 supra; Zenn v. Anzalone, 1 App. Div. 2d 662, 146 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1955).
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objection in the settlement proceedings rather than by collateral attack on
the compromise. " If the exclusion was indeed improper, it should weigh
against the approval of the settlement, for the excluded plaintiff might
well have improved the settlement terms, and while this may be hard to
demonstrate, the proponents of the compromise should not be helped by a
difficulty of proof created by their improper conduct. "'
The Beneficiary Corporation.The corporation on whose behalf a derivative
suit is brought is the owner of the claims in controversy. Since a compromise of the action operates to discharge these claims, the corporation's
joinder in the settlement agreement is essential.7
Nevertheless, the corporation's part in the settlement negotiations is
usually insignificant. A stockholder's derivative action lies only if the directors cannot or will not bring a corporate suit."' The directors will thus,
as a rule, be hostile to the suit and cannot be effective champions of the
corporate interests in the settlement talks. Nor is the corporation's hand
appreciably strengthened by the requirement that it be represented by
9
separate counsel different from the attorneys for the real defendants;
the corporation's counsel can hardly be expected to be unfriendly to the
directors who selected him.' In cases of this kind, the joinder of the corporation in a compromise negotiated by the stockholder-plaintiff is little
more than a necessary formality.
Occasionally, however, the board does take an active, sometimes even a
decisive role in the negotiations. This may happen particularly if the board
membership has changed during the litigation and the new directors are
not identified or allied with the alleged wrongdoers. In these circumstances,
the board and the complaining stockholder should collaborate in the ne17

See text accompanying notes 515-23 infra.

Contra, Zenn v. Anzalone, 1 App. Div. 2d 662, 146 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1955) (the exclusion is
improper only if it is shown to have had an adverse effect on the settlement).
179See Beaudette v. Graham, 267 Mass. 7, 11-12, 165 N.E. 671, 672-73 (1929); Hornstein,
New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLlUM. L. REv. 1, 20 (1947).
'FED.
R. Civ. P. 23.1; 13 W. FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §§ 5963-64 (M. Wolf rev. ed. 1961).
' For this requirement see, e.g., Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1967); Murphy v.
Washington Am. League Baseball Club, 324 F.2d 394, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (derivative action
on behalf of labor union); Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1962); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246, 255-57 (D.D.C. 1965); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co.,
218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Elberta Oil Co. v. Superior Ct., 108 Cal. App. 344, 291 P.
668 (1930); Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647, 654
(Ch. 1962); Garlen v. Green Mansions, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 760, 193 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1959);
Opinion 842 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York; Note, Independent Representation for Corporate Defenudants in Derivative Suits,
74 YALE L.J. 524 (1965).
The requirement is not always rigidly enforced. See Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 699-700
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962); Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, 268 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959); Kelly v. 74 & 76 West Tremont Ave. Corp., 24
Misc. 2d 370, 198 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1960). A few cases have completely rejected it. SelamaDindings Plantations v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104, 115-16 (S.D. Ohio 1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d
949 (6th Cir. 1964); Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1944),
aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
... Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed, No.
23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956) (close association of the
lawyer for the corporation with the law firm representing the defendant directors does not establish
collusion); see Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49, 58 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (it is no objection to the validity of the settlement that it was negotiated by directors who were under the
control of the principal defendant).
17
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gotiations, and usually will do so."' If collaboration should fail, the stockholder-plaintiff has no absolute veto against a compromise worked out by
an independent board. Despite his dissent, it has been held, a settlement
negotiated by a board free from disqualifying interests may be accepted
by the court for review and may, if fair, receive judicial approval.'
As a practical matter, derivative settlements concluded over the head
of the complaining stockholder are extremely rare and should be so. The
judgment of the active litigant, whose initiative and investment of resources have developed the case, should not be lightly disregarded; his zeal
as class representative would be dampened if he could be readily ousted by
a board-arranged settlement. The court may, therefore, be expected to
frown on a compromise from which the plaintiff was excluded without
8 5
compelling justification."
VI.

THE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

In considering the merits of a settlement, the court and the class are
naturally interested in the result achieved rather than in the negotiations
by which it is reached. A decision of the Sixth Circuit, Masterson v. Pergament,"' carries this attitude to a rather extreme length: If upon full development of the facts the court finds the compromise in the best interest
of the corporation, the settlement should be approved although the negotiating shareholder was ignorant of relevant facts or had been deceived by
his opponents or even had adverse interests preventing an arm's length
deal.
This approach, it would seem, takes too light a view of the importance
of the settlement negotiations. The court, to be sure, will not approve a
settlement if it is unfair,"' 7 but "fairness" may be found anywhere within
a broad range of lower and upper limits. No one can tell whether a compromise found to be "fair" might not have been even "fairer" had the negotiating stockholder possessed better information or been animated by
undivided loyalty to the cause of the class. The court can reject a settlement that is inadequate; it cannot undertake the partisan task of bargain'. See, e.g., Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Perrine v. Pennroad
Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 342, 352-57, 43 A.2d 721, 725 (Ch. 1945), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47 A.2d
479 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1946); Armstrong v. Doyle, New York Law Journal,
July 27, 1961, at 5, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.), modified and aff'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 916, 229 N.Y.S.2d 165
(1962), motion to dismiss appeal denied, 12 N.Y.2d 1067, 190 N.E.2d 847, 239 N.Y.S.2d 889
(1963); Bysheim v. Miranda, 44 N.Y.S.2d 15, 20 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
4
'8 Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 45 F. Supp. 524, 528-29 (N.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd, 141
F.2d 285, 288 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d
748, 144 P.2d 725 (1944), Annot., 150 A.L.R. 872 (1944); see Wolf v. Nazareth Enterprises, Inc.,
303 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1962). But see Standard Home & Say. Ass'n v. Pratt, 64 Ohio St. 147,
(derivative action cannot be settled between corporation and
158-59, 59 N.E. 885, 887 (1901)
wrongdoer without the stockholder-plaintiff; but corporation's board apparently included wrongdoers). With respect to corporate out-of-court settlements, see notes 545-61 infra, and accompanying text. For the effect of board approval on the judicial determination of the fairness of the
settlement, see notes 402-08 infra, and accompanying text.
"' In the leading case on the subject, the stockholder-plaintiff had forfeited his right to consideration by his lawyer's insistence on a fee arrangement as a condition of his consent to the
settlement. Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 45 F. Supp. 524, 530 (N.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd,
141 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944).
'8s203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).
18 See text accompanying notes 350-61 infra.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

ing for better terms.' s The integrity of the negotiating process is, therefore, important.
Most of the authorities insist, accordingly, on the minimal requirement
that the settlement negotiations be conducted in "good faith" and be
free from "fraud" and "collusion.'.. 9 These terms are obviously incapable
of precise definition; a bribe secretly promised to the plaintiff's representative,"' a stockholder's action "planted" by the defendants,"' an excessive
fee for the plaintiff's counsel agreed on in return for an inadequate settlement 112may serve as illustrations. Fee agreements, in particular, are a sensitive subject"9' and should preferably not be discussed until after the terms
of the settlement proper are fixed." Collusive negotiations, lack of arm'slength trading or fraud practiced on the negotiating stockholder should
lead to the rejection of the settlement no matter how acceptable it may
otherwise appear.
It is not too clear whether a more demanding scrutiny of the negotiating process would be fruitful or practicable. The degree of skill and efficiency employed in the negotiations is not measurable; a "take-it-or-leaveit" offer quickly accepted may be as effective as long-drawn bargaining;
a shrewd guess at the adversary's weaknesses and strengths may produce
as good a compromise as lengthy depositions. In approving a settlement,
M

the courts will at times refer to the length and difficulty of the negotiations,"' the sophistication and bargaining power of the plaintiffs,"° the
988 An unfair settlement can be approved on condition that its terms are bettered; see text
accompanying notes 391, 392 infra.
18 See, e.g., Geller v. Bohen, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,429 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1969);
Lessac v. Television-Electronics Fund, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,305 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Derdiarian v.
Futterman Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178, 179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F.
Supp. 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed, No. 23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956); Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Campbell v. Railroad Co., 4 F. Cas. 1178 (No. 2366) (E.D. Tex. 1871); Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 28 Del. Ch.
342, 357, 43 A.2d 721, 728 (Ch. 1945), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47 A.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947); Yaeger v. Phillips, New York Law Journal, Dec. 15, 1953,
at 1452, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.); Bysheim v. Miranda, 44 N.Y.S.2d 15, 23 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
"'Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 327
(2d Cir. 1964), aff'd en bane, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed sub nom. Holt v.
Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966) (secret bribe might be basis for collateral attack on courtapproved settlement). The secrecy of the bribe should not be material; "the publicity alone of an
illegal and unauthorized act [of fiduciaries] does not make it legal or valid." Blum v. Fleishhacker,
21 F. Supp. 527, 533 (N.D. Cal. 1937), modified and aff'd, 109 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 665 (1940). But see Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 438, 198 A.2d 185, 204-05
(Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch. 123, 205 A.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965) (corporation's agreement to pay the stockholder-plaintiff's lawyer
a $20,000 fee for his services in a libel action brought by the corporation against the stockholderplaintiff was a "negative factor" in evaluating the derivative settlement, but was no basis for rejecting the settlement since it was not a device for an out-of-court pay-off).
"'OSee Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 299 F.2d 449, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"'2

Id.

194 See text accompanying notes 278-89 infra.
1 See Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358, 367-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Grossman v. Playboy Clubs
Int'l, 5 Inc., No. 882,939 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Jan. 16, 1969, at 12, Selber, J.).
19 Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir.
1967); Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 342, 43 A.2d 721 (Ch. 1945), aff'd, 29 Del.
Ch. 531, 47 A.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947); Waterman Corp. v.
Johnston, 106 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1073, 113 N.Y.S.2d 287,
288, appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 879, 109 N.E.2d 887 (1952).
...Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FEs. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,315 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D. Mass. 1963).
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reputation and experience of their counsel,"' and the extensive pre-settlement discovery proceedings.. as supporting factors, but remarks like these
are probably little more than makeweights. A few cases, however, have
struck down or at least questioned class settlements negotiated in complete
ignorance of the pertinent facts. While the negotiator's lack of information was not the sole ground on which these decisions rested, it seems
reasonable for a court not to entertain a compromise that has been blind-

ly reached in such a haphazard fashion.""
VII.

THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The Claims To Be Settled and Their Release. Since the defendants' aim in
settling is peace, they will seek freedom from further litigation and liabil-

ity as broad and secure as the law permits. The principal means to that
end is the judgment approving the settlement and dismissing the action
on the merits. In derivative cases, the effect of the judgment is usually reinforced by releases, which the beneficiary corporation undertakes to execute upon the approval of the compromise. In representative suits there is

no one with power to give a release of the class rights in addition to the
judgment.
The protection afforded the defendants by the judgment rests on its res

judicata effect and is, therefore, limited to the claims alleged in the pleadings. In order to broaden the scope of the judgment, the defendants fre-

quently insist that the complaint be amended in advance of
promise so as to add related claims, including particularly all
action involved in companion suits. This practice has generally
judicial sanction,"' ° but it ought not to result in the sacrifice of

the comcauses of
met with
the added

"'°Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Fox v. Glickman
Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (S.D.N.Y, 1966).
Fund, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,305
"' Lessac v. Television-Electronics
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Cherner v. Transitron Electronics Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D. Mass. 1963);
Isaacs v. Forer, 39 Del. Ch. 105, 159 A.2d 295 (Ch. 1960).
"' United States Lines, Inc. v. United States Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 1938) (settlement of corporation's action against its parent for nominal consideration had been recommended
by independent stockholders' committee without investigation or findings and was approved by
stockholders; dismissal of action was denied and minority shareholder permitted to intervene and
prosecute); Dembitzer v. First Republic Corp., '64-'66 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,566 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (res judicata effect of state court settlement sustained because of lack of factual support for
charge that negotiating lawyer had been inadequately prepared); System Meat Co. v. Stewart, 163
N.W'.2d 789, 792 (Neb. 1969) (settlement rejected because evidence of investigation and negotiation was vague and corporation's president knew no facts from which likelihood of success of
action might be reasonably estimated). See also Ferguson v. Birrell, 190 F. Supp. 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), aff'd sub nom. Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1961); Dann v. Chrysler Corp.,
41 Del. Ch. 438, 198 A.2d 185, 191 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nora. Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch.
(plaintiffs' agreement to
123, 205 A.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965)
the settlement on condition that they be given a reasonable discovery in order to form a judgment
regarding the merits of the compromise was a "negative factor" because of the possibilities of abuse;
nevertheless, the settlement was approved); Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 152 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (plaintiff's failure to take depositions was harmless because of the availability of documentary evidence).
...Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 50 (D. Mass. 1963) (amendment
of complaint allowed, subject to being vacated if settlement should not become effective) ; Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 921, 928 (D. Mass. 1958) (amendment at first rejected as
"technical sleight of hand," but subsequently, after improvement of settlement terms, allowed);
Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 20 (E.D. Mich. 1950), aff'd sub nom. Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953); Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 41
Del. Ch. 438, 198 A.2d 185, 187 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub noir. Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch. 123,
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claims without adequate exploration and fair consideration. 01
The amendment technique has its limitations. The plaintiff in a derivative action cannot, as a rule, allege a cause of action which predates the
time at which he became a stockholder.202 Sometimes, also, a state court
asked to pass on a settlement may lack subject matter jurisdiction of
claims which are related to those pending before it but which arise in the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, such as claims under the anti-

trust laws0 s or fraud claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.20

It is a matter of some doubt whether claims of this sort can be discharged
by the res judicata effect of the state court judgment approving the compromise."'
In a derivative action, a release executed by the beneficiary corporation
may sometimes accomplish what the judgment of dismissal cannot achieve.

In Abramson v. Pennwood Investment Corp."' a derivative suit in the federal court attacked a transaction both as a common law breach of fiduciary
duty and as a fraud in violation of the Securities Exchange Act. A companion suit in the state court alleging only the fiduciary breach was settled

with court approval. Although the state judgment as such could not affect
the 1934 Act claim, the corporate release of that claim, having been approved as part of the state settlement, was held to be a complete bar to
the federal action. The decision, it might be suggested, failed to give due

effect to the exclusive nature of the federal jurisdiction of the Securities
Exchange Act claim. In order to approve the release of that claim the

state court had to evaluate its prospect of success; such a quasi-adjudication, it would seem, has been reserved to the federal courts by section 27

of the 1934 Act.207
Apart from these jurisdictional limitations, the settlement release should
be restricted to claims arising out of the transactions alleged in the complaint." A general release, in particular, ought not to be entertained since
205 A.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965); Pearson v. Prospect Hill Apartments, 19 Misc. 2d 51, 195 N.Y.S.2d 471, 474 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (court allowed amendment adding
derivative claims to a representative action for the avowed purpose of including them in the settlement).
I0In Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13
(E.D. Mich. 1950), aff'd sub nom. Masterson v.
Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953), the new claims were added
to the complaint only after the settlement terms had been agreed on (see the statement in the dissenting opinion on appeal, 203 F.2d at 322-23). Such a procedure raises the danger that the new
claims are surrendered without investigation into their merits and that the settlement consideration
is fixed with no allowance, or inadequate allowance, for the value of the new claims.
202
2 FEn. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
03Clayton
Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
2
04Section
10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5
(1969). Federal jurisdiction is exclusive by virtue of the Securities Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1964).
21 See text accompanying notes 493-98 infra.
20'392 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1968).
21715 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
'°SSee Rutman v. Kaminsky, 226 A.2d 122, 126 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1967) (a release from "any
matter related to any acts or transactions described in the complaints" is not too general); Perrine
v. Pennroad Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47 A.2d 479, 484 (Sup. Ct. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
808 (1947) (sustaining release of all claims "in any way connected with or growing out of the
same subject matter which is included in the three suits now pending"); Berger v. Dyson, 111
F. Supp. 533, 534 (D.R.I. 1953) (release of all claims alleged in the complaint and in all companion suit complaints).
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the court should not put its seal on the surrender of unknown claims.0 "'
If the stockholder-plaintiff's cause predates in whole or in part his ownership of stock, a release of the earlier claim should, as a rule, not too readily
be permitted, since the plaintiff's disability to litigate that claim may impair his efficiency in negotiating a fair consideration for its release. 1' The
inclusion of the earlier claim in the settlement is not, however, a jurisdictional defect and does not invalidate the settlement or the release. 11
The Persons Protected by the Settlement. The discharge of claims by the
settlement operates normally in favor of all defendants before the court.
It is not necessary that each of them contribute to the settlement; the law
is concerned with the adequacy of the settlement consideration, not with
its source. 12 The individual contributions to the compromise need, therefore, not even be disclosed. 1" There is no obstacle to a partial settlement
which discharges less than all the defendants or all the claims. 14
The settlement often provides also for the discharge of persons not before the court who might be involved in the transactions complained of.
Appropriate recitals in the judgment as well as the release should identify
these non-party beneficiaries. 1 ' While provisions of this kind generally
have been sustained,"' their legal basis is a matter of controversy. In
Stella v. Kaiser17 the majority opinion by Judge Learned Hand held that
209 Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 928 (D. Mass. 1958.) (general release for limited period approved, but only
because of the exceptionally thorough investigation of the corporate affairs); Winkelman v.
General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 495-96, modified, 48 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Spelfogel v. Baker, New York Law Journal, Dec. 14, 1967, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.) (releases sustained
because limited to the settled causes of action) ; Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 809,
813 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (general release approved but claims pending in companion suit excepted from
release). Prior to the adoption of FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) or its state equivalents, general releases
were sanctioned. Karasik v. Pacific E. Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 180 A. 604, 612 (Ch. 1935); Mendelson Bros. Factors v. Sachs, 253 App. Div. 270, 1 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841, aff'd, 279 N.Y. 604, 17
N.E.2d 459 (1938).
.. Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 921-22 (D. Mass. 1958); Winkelman v. General
Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 496, 499, modified, 48 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
.. Dembitzer v. First Republic Corp., '64-'66 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,566 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
2
12Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953);
Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Rutman v. Kaminsky, 226 A.2d 122,
126 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1967); Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (Sup. Ct.
1952) (settlement offer made by a defendant not served with process); Bysheim v. Miranda, 44
N.Y.S.2d 15, 30 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
...Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
214Drexel v. Loomis, 35 F.2d 800, 806-07 (8th Cir. 1929); Roman v. Master Indus., Inc.,
'66-'67 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,806 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Spelfogel v. Baker, New York Law
Journal, Dec. 14, 1967, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). If the settlement is made with part of the defendants only, the others have no standing to object. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Amer.
Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1967). The judgment approving a partial settlement
should contain appropriate recitals under FED. R. CIv. P. 54(b).
" Thus a settlement may provide for the discharge of all named defendants, whether or not
served in the action, and of all directors, officers, employees, agents, attorneys and accountants of
any of the named defendants.
21Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954), rehearing denied, 221 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955); Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D.R.I. 1953); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 496, modified, 48 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49, 58 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Lifmann v. Aronson, 42
Del. Ch. 46, 203 A.2d 252, 256 (Ch. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 42 Del. Ch. 367, 212 A.2d
403 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
217218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954), rehearing denied, 221 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 835 (1955).
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only the release, as distinguished from the judgment, can operate to discharge a non-party;2 18 the concurring opinion of Judge Charles E. Clark
ascribed the same effect to the judgment itself." ' In a derivative action such
as Stella, this subtle distinction has small importance since the beneficiary
corporation can always give the release; but in a representative suit, in
which no one can give a release binding the class, the majority view would
render the discharge of non-parties impossible. In recent years, however,
the limitation of res judicata to parties and their privies has been greatly
relaxed 21 so that it seems likely that Judge Clark's approach would today
prevail"' and permit the discharge of non-parties by force of the judgment alone, regardless of any release.Y
The Settlement Consideration. The price which the defendants pay for
their discharge must be a fair equivalent of the corporate or class claims
to be settled. Apart from this requirement, which will be discussed later,
the parties normally enjoy great freedom in shaping the form of the settlement consideration."' The variety of terms is almost inexhaustible. Cash
is, of course, the most frequent settlement coin. In representative actions
it is paid to the members of the class, often through the medium of a master or paying agent.' 4 In derivative cases it is paid to the beneficiary corporation .. or sometimes-particularly if the defendants own a large ma"s8218 F.2d at 68-69; 221 F.2d at 116. The effectiveness of the release of a federal claim is
governed by federal law. 221 F.2d at 116.
2" 218 F.2d at 67.
".See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
934 (1964); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596
(1967); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957). Contra, 1B J.
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5

0.412

(2d ed.

1965).

.' See Saylor v. Lindsley, 274 F. Supp. 253, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
391 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1968).
222 In order to broaden the personal scope of res judicata it may be advisable to provide in the
settlement stipulation that any person named as a defendant but not served may, at any time before
final judgment, enter his appearance in the action and become a party to the settlement by serving
and filing a notice to that effect. Frequently this is amplified by a further provision that such an
appearance shall become ineffective if the settlement is disapproved.
... Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741, 747 (Ch. 1960) (settlement may
take many forms, but certain caveats should be observed; see note 263 infra; for possible limitations, see also text accompanying notes 260-71 infra); Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc. 2d 648, 241
N.Y.S.2d 642, 654 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (in derivative action, court has the same power as an independent board of directors to entertain settlements, no matter what their particular form or mechanics may be).
2 Wittner v. Ghen, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,502 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1969); Ferraioli
v. Cantor, '67-'69 CCH FE. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,336 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1969); Mersay v.
First Republic Corp. of America, '67-'69 CCH FEo. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,304 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967);
Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Derdiarian v. Futterman
Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp.
48 (D. Mass. 1963). The class members in these cases were notified to file their claims with the
master within specified time limits; the master was to determine, subject to judicial supervision, the
propriety and amounts of the claims and to direct their payment out of the settlement fund in
accordance with the formula provided in the settlement stipulation. For similar distribution mechanics after judgment on the merits in favor of the class, see Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 587-88 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963).
225 Among the largest reported cash settlements are Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 342,
348, 43 A.2d 721, 728 (Ch. 1945), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47 A.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947) ($15 million); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp.
48, 54 (D. Mass. 1963) ($5,300,000); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490,
499, modified, 48 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ($4,500,000); Armstrong v. Doyle, New York
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jority of the corporate stock--directly to the minority shareholders."0 A
class or group of stockholders may be offered the right to sell, exchange or
surrender their shares at an attractive price.22 ' Instead of paying cash, the
defendants may deliver stock (including the beneficiary corporation's
own stock) or other property,"' release a corporate obligation,"' or cancel
a burdensome contract of the corporation." The guaranty by a defendant
of a loan to the corporation has been held to be good settlement consideration.2"'
The immediate payment of cash or its equivalent is not essential; at
times the consideration for a compromise lies partly or wholly in the future. The settlement may be payable in installments over an extended
period.2 A class suit on behalf of members of a dining club was settled
by granting them credits against their future purchases at the club.23 A
corporate executive may agree to reduce his salary for a number of years"
or simply extend his employment contract;

he may cancel stock options

held by him or modify their terms to the advantage of the corporation."
An incentive compensation plan for the officers or employees of the corLaw Journal, July 27, 1961, at 5, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.), modified and aff'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 916, 229
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1962) ($3,350,000 cash plus non-cash benefits equivalent to $10 million).
"22Sarasohn v. Andrew Jergens Co., 45 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (preferred stockholder's
derivative action against parent of beneficiary corporation was settled by cash payment to the latter, to be distributed by it only to its minority stockholders); Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F.
Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1958) (the unreported terms of the settlement ultimately approved, id. at
924-28, were similar to those in Sarasohn, supra). See also Part I of this Article, supra note 153,
at note 6.
227 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,315 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (representative and derivative action); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 273 F. Supp. 863
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (action brought by SEC); Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (representative action); Sauer v. Newhouse, 26 F. Supp. 326 (D.N.J. 1939)
(derivative action); Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (representative action). Contra, Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp., 44 Ill. App. 2d 135, 194
N.E.2d 35 (1963).
22 Karasik v. Pacific E. Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 180 A. 604 (Ch. 1935); Lieferant v. Bartell,
36 Misc. 2d 477, 232 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (the settlement, at first rejected as insufficient, was finally approved after the number of shares to be surrendered was doubled; Lieferant
v. Bartell, New York Law Journal, Dec. 11, 1962, at 16, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.)); Waterman Corp. v.
Johnston, 106 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818-19 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1073, 113 N.Y.S.2d
287, 288, appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 879, 109 N.E.2d 887 (1952); Price v. Creole Petroleum
Corp., New York Law Journal, May 13, 1947, at 1878, cols. 3 & 4 (Sup. Ct.), modified and aff'd,
273 App. Div. 890, 77 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1948); Beeber v. Empire Power Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 914
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
229 Kors v. United Whelan Corp., '57-'61 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 90,970 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Silverstein v. Clarkson, 194 Misc. 1046, 88 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Mann v. Luke, 82
N.Y.S.2d 725, 732-33 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
... Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 559, 156 A.2d 90, 94 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Armstrong
v. Doyle, New York Law Journal, July 27, 1961, at 5, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.), modified and aff'd, 16
App. Div. 2d 916, 229 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1962).
a'Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 335-36 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832
(1953) (since the corporation was in desperate financial straits, the guaranty alone might have
been adequate settlement consideration even if it had not been combined with cash and other benefits); Roman v. Master Indus., Inc., '66-'67 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,806 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
232 Spelfogel v. Baker, New York Law Journal, Dec. 14, 1967, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
2" Grossman v. Playboy Clubs Int'l, Inc., No. 882,939 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County,
Jan.2 16,
1969, at 4, Selber, J.).
4
" Silverstein v. Clarkson, 194 Misc. 1046, 88 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (salary reduction for seven years was estimated to produce corporate savings of $1,750,000). A rather extreme case, Spelfogel v. Baker, New York Law Journal, Dec. 14, 1967, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.),
approved a salary reduction as part of the settlement consideration although the executive had been
sentenced to a jail term.
22 Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 809, 817 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
2
.Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 559, 156 A.2d 90, 94 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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poration may be revised for the future in favor of the corporation." '
Numerous derivative and representative suits brought in recent years on
behalf of investment companies against their corporate investment advisers and underwriters have been settled by a reduction of the management fees. 9 or through the assumption by the defendants of the companies' operating expenses for long-term periods of years; a9 similar compromises have been sanctioned in stockholder suits involving other types
of corporations." ' This kind of compromise does not always give absolute
assurance that the projected settlement benefits will be fully realized, for
the expected savings may be cut short if the employment relation with
the executive or the management corporation is prematurely terminated."4
Nevertheless, the settlements have been sanctioned if the completion of the
arrangement appeared sufficiently probable. " The judicial approval of
settlements of this type is not intended to foreclose possible future claims
by stockholders that the rate of compensation, although reduced by the
compromise, is still excessive."
""7Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Prince v. Bensinger, 244 A.2d 89
(Del. Ch. 1958); Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 438, 198 A.2d 185 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub
nora. Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch. 123, 205 A.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
973 (1965); Diamond v. Davis, 62 N.Y.S.2d 181, 185 (Sup. Ct. 1945). But see Duane v. Menzies, 37 Del. Ch. 416, 144 A.2d 229, 233 (Ch. 1958): An action attacking an ofcers' compensation agreement as unfair was settled by modifying the compensation formula for the future
but without restoring any part of the alleged past overpayments. In rejecting the compromise,
the court deemed it inconsistent to treat the old compensation formula as unfair for the future
but not for the past. Actually, however, the settlement did not admit unfairness for either the
past or the future but compromised the disputed fairness issue by allowing the corporation
future benefits which it could not have achieved if, at a trial on the merits, the fairness of the
old plan had been sustained.
2. Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 148-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Kerner v. Crossman, 211 F.
Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Saxe v. Crossman, '61-'64 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,159
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Saminsky
v. Abbott, 41 Del. Ch. 320, 194 A.2d 549 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Kleinman v. Saminsky,
41 Del. Ch. 572, 200 A.2d 572 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964); Ackert v. Ausman,
Referee's Report, July 18, 1963, at 31-49 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 850, 247 N.Y.S.2d
999 (1964); Rosenfeld v. Richardson, New York Law Journal, May 31, 1962, at 13, col. 3 (Sup.
Ct.); Kellmer v. Prankard, New York Law Journal, Mar. 26, 1962, at 14, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.). For
a review of these and similar unreported settlements, see SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No.
2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33, 138-41, 154 (1966).
239 Josephson v. Campbell, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,347 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1969);
Lessac v. Television-Electronics Fund, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,305 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Elster v. Dreyfus, '66-'67 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 290 N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1968);
Ackert v. Ausman, Referee's Report, July 18, 1963, at 31-49 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d
850,24 247 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1964).
°Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966) (waiver of management fee;
New York state court judgment approving the settlement was given effect as res judicata) ; Goodman
v. Futrovsky, 42 Del. Ch. 468, 213 A.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (stockholder claimed that his corporation had purchased supplies from insiders at excessive prices; action settled by ten-year supply
contract between the beneficiary corporation and supply company limiting the latter's permissible
profits and granting beneficiary corporation an option to buy supply company after ten years at
fixed price); Pearson v. Prospect Hill Apartments, Inc., 19 Misc. 2d 51, 195 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup.
Ct. 1959) (reduction of management fee).
241 An investment company cannot enter into a binding long-term investment advisory (management) contract since, under Investment Company Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1964), the
contract terminates unless the board of directors or the stockholders of the investment company
renew it from year to year.
242 See particularly Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Prince v. Bensinger,
244 A.2d 89, 93, 95 (Del. Ch. 1968); Ackert v. Ausman, Referee's Report, July 18, 1963, at
31-49 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 850, 247 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1964).
'"Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 41
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If a stockholder's action reveals serious corporate mismanagement, the
settlement consideration may and sometimes must include curative or preventive provisions of a non-monetary character: the appointment of a
receiver, 44 the election of new directors selected with the approval of the
court" or of the plaintiff," the appointment of independent accountants,"C or the complete or partial liquidation of the corporation." The
outstanding stock may be reshuffled to divest the insiders of control' 5 or
to eliminate a festering conflict of interests."' The court will not, however, undertake the continued supervision of the corporate affairs.5 1
The settlement consideration may also take the form of a mutual giveand-take between the beneficiary corporation and the defendants, such
as the sale or lease of property by or to the corporation on terms attractive to it,"' or the termination of an executive's long-term employment
contract deemed onerous to the corporation against payment to the executive of a separation allowance.2

3

A compromise calling for the revision

Del. Ch. 438, 198 A.2d 185, 203-04 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch.
123, 205 A.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965) (stockholder's suit settled
by revision of incentive compensation plan; approval of the settlement is not a judicial imprimatur
of the future operation of the plan) ; Ackert v. Ausman, Referee's Report, July 18, 1963, at 45-46
(Sup.
244 Ct.), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 850, 247 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1964).
Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 922-24 (D. Mass. 1958) (original settlement
disapproved for failure to provide for receivership, which the court deemed necessary because of
the systematic wrongdoing of the principal defendant).
245 Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1958) (under the unreported terms
of the amended settlement); Armstrong v. Doyle, New York Law Journal, July 27, 1961, at 5,
col. 5 (Sup. Ct.), modified and afi'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 916, 229 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1962).
246 Roman v. Master Indus., Inc., '66-'67 CCH FEn. Sac. L. REI'. 5 91,806 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
4
a Armstrong v. Doyle, New York Law Journal, July 27, 1961, at 5, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
24 Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1958) (under the unreported terms
of the amended settlement); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 273 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (insiders agreed, upon liquidation, to subordinate their senior stock claims to the junior claims of the
public stockholders); Sarasohn v. Andrew Jergens Co., 45 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (liquidation payments to be made only to minority shareholders). In Sonnino v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co.,
New York Law Journal, June 20, 1961, at 11, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.), the corporation agreed to adopt
the policy of spending specified amounts for the purchase of its stock in the market for purposes
of retirement.
249 Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178, 180-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (surrender by
insiders of part of their control shares and consequent transfer of control to public stockholders);
Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741 (Ch. 1960). But see Steigman v. Beery,
42 Del. Ch. 53, 203 A.2d 463, 467 (Ch. 1964) (surrender of absolute voting control by insider
charged with fraudulent abuse of control held not to be adequate settlement basis).
55
" Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc. 2d 648, 241 N.Y.S.2d 642, 645-46 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (directorofficers of parent company exchanged their 50 per cent stock interest in subsidiary for minority
stock in parent).
"' In Armstrong v. Doyle, 16 App. Div. 2d 916, 229 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1962), the appellate court
eliminated settlement provision permitting any director to seek court's instructions if contemplated corporate transaction should create impression of impropriety. But the appellate court left
undisturbed a provision adding three directors to the board and requiring, for a specified period,
court approval of their or their successors' election. See lower court's decision, Armstrong v. Doyle,
New York Law Journal, July 27, 1961, at 5, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
25 Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 335 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953)
(settlement consideration included sale by corporation to a defendant of machinery at a price in
excess of recoverable value); Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 559, 156 A.2d 90, 94 (Sup.
Ct. 1959) (cancellation of one corporate lease, renewal of another); Gladstone v. Bennett, 38 Del.
Ch. 391, 396, 401, 153 A.2d 577, 580 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (corporation and its affiliate received cash
payments but corporation waived charges for services and commissions); Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc.
2d 648, 241 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (supra note 250); Pearson v. Prospect Hill Apartments, Inc., 19 Misc. 2d 51, 195 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1959) .(corporations received cash and
other benefits but agreed to pay increased rentals for properties leased to them).
..a Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 559, 156 A.2d 90, 94 (Sup. Ct. 1959); see Cohn v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 809, 815-16 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (increased expense allowance
for executive).
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or replacement of an incentive compensation plan may in part lighten
and in part increase the burdens of the corporation, provided that the
balance of benefits preponderates clearly in favor of the corporation.""
Some settlements, conceived on a grand scale, have provided for a corporate merger, reorganization or recapitalization designed for the advantage
of the beneficiary class or corporation. 5 The consummation of such a compromise depends, of course, on the vote of the stockholders prescribed by
statute for mergers and similar transactions; the statutory appraisal rights
of dissenting shareholders cannot be impaired." It is an intriguing and
unresolved question whether the judicial approval of a settlement of this
kind precludes a separate plenary stockholder's action to enjoin or rescind
the merger on grounds such as gross unfairness, proxy fraud or antitrust
violation. It would seem preferable to permit the separate action to proceed since the rather summary nature of the settlement proceedings" ' does
not lend itself to a full exploration of the complex merger issues.5"' Correspondingly, a court presented with such a settlement might, in the exercise of discretion, refuse to entertain it if the proposed merger is open to
a plausible attack warranting a trial on the merits."
In New York, Brill v. Blakeley' held that the consideration for the
compromise of a representative (as distinguished from derivative) action
must be of the same kind as the relief which might be awarded if the
action went to trial and judgment. This restriction, characterized as
"iurisdictional," was considered necessary because the representative plaintiff's implied authority to compromise class claims was deemed to be limited by the scope of his pleadings. By contrast, derivative settlements must
be approved by the board of directors of the beneficiary corporation,
and the board's power to compromise corporate claims is not circumscribed
by the pleadings in a stockholder's action."' The rather rigid doctrine of
the Brill case has so far not been accepted elsewhere; it would seem overly
dogmatic and can easily be avoided by an amendment of the complaint
adding a derivative cause to the representative claims."' A number of
Delaware decisions stand for a more flexible rule, applicable to both de254

Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 438, 198 A.2d 185 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nam. Hoffman
v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch. 123, 205 A.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965).
But settlements of this type are rejected if the corporate benefits are too uncertain. Nadler v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 427, 154 A.2d 146, 150 (Ch. 1959); see Duane v. Menzies, 37
Del. Ch. 416, 144 A.2d 229, 233 (Ch. 1958).
25 Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741 (Ch. 1960); Levey v. Babb, 39
Misc. 2d 648, 241 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Rosenak v. Lucas, New York Law Journal,
Mar. 11, 1947, at 959, col. 7 (Sup. Ct.); Posen v. Cowdin, New York Law Journal, June 3, 1943,
at 2164, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.), motion to dismiss appeal denied, 267 App. Div. 158, 44 N.Y.S.2d 842
(stockholder's derivative action on behalf of subsidiary company against its parent was
(1943)
settled by subsidiary's merger into parent upon terms giving effect to the value of the subsidiary's
claim);
25 5 Corash v. Texas Corp., New York Law Journal, Mar. 2, 1943, at 830, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.).
Brill v. Blakeley, 281 App. Div. 532, 120 N.Y.S.2d 713, 718 (1953), afl'd, 308 N.Y. 951,

96 (1955).
127 2N.E.2d
7

s See text accompanying notes 371-78, 449-60 infra.
also text accompanying note 243 supra.
25 See also text accompanying note 263 infra.

2155See

2'0281 App. Div. 532, 120 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 951, 127 N.E.2d 96 (1955).
"I Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc. 2d 648, 241 N.Y.S.2d 642, 654 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
26Pearson v. Prospect Hill Apartments, Inc., 19 Misc. 2d 51, 195 N.Y,$12d 471, 474 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
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rivative and representative suits, requiring the court to "be careful not to
permit [the settlement] to become a vehicle to obtain blanket judicial approval of unrelated matters or transactions having important future imponderables." ' Even this rule, however, appears to have only limited impact, for in practice Delaware as well as other courts tend to be generous
in sustaining settlements involving a consideration which is rather far removed from the subject matter of the litigation.'
Under familiar rules of contract law, a settlement lacks consideration if the defendant undertakes to give or do only what is already required of him by a clear pre-existing obligation." A related but somewhat different problem arises where, prior to the court's action on the
settlement, the consideration has already been executed or otherwise
become indefeasible. In such a case the judicial rejection of the compromise might enable the class or corporation to keep the consideration and
still to proceed with the litigation; but if the consideration is otherwise
fair, the court will not indulge in such a ruthless exploitation of a tactical

advantage.'
If an action asserts a number of separate claims, it is, as a rule, not nec-

essary to assign a separate consideration for the discharge of each claim," 7
and it is not customary to do so. A more differentiated treatment, how-

ever, may be indicated for a compromise that disposes of derivative as
well as representative claims, for a settlement consideration given to the
corporation is not necessarily a benefit to the class. "' This will also be true
2 55

Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741, 747 (Ch. 1960). See Prince v.
Bensinger, 244 A.2d 89, 96 (Del. Ch. 1968); Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 438, 198 A.2d
185, 199 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch. 123, 205 A.2d 343 (Sup. Ct.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965); Nadler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 427, 154
A.2d 146, 150-51 (Ch. 1959).
264See, e.g., Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 156 A.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Gladstone v.
Bennett, 38 Del. Ch. 391, 153 A.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Lieferant v. Bartell, 36 Misc. 2d 477,
232 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (supra note 228); Pearson v. Prospect Hill Apartments, Inc.,
19 Misc. 2d 51, 195 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1959); cases cited in note 255 supra.
2" Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 33 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582 (9th
Cir., July 29, 1968) (benefits of stockholder's settlement are inadequate if earlier settlement with
SEC provides for the same benefits).
2S Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 320, 335-36 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832
(1953) (guaranty of corporate debt by defendant, constituting part of settlement consideration, was
executed same day application for judicial approval of settlement was filed); SEC v. S & P Nat'l
Corp., 273 F. Supp. 863, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (in approving settlement of SEC suit, court noted
that consent judgments previously entered against certain defendants had attained the practical
objective of the action); Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 149-50, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(court treated as part of settlement benefits a reduction of mutual fund's future advisory fees
although reduction became effective prior to and independently of court's approval of settlement);
Ackert v. Ausman, Referee's Report, July 18, 1963, at 38-40 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d
850, 247 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1964) (similar to Glicken v. Bradford, supra). But see Duane v. Menzies,
37 Del. Ch. 416, 144 A.2d 229, 233 (Ch. 1958) (in rejecting settlement, court noted that settlement consideration, consisting of modification of incentive compensation plan, would remain in
effect regardless of court's ruling on the sufficiency of the settlement).
2.. Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741, 747-48 (Ch. 1960); Spelfogel v.
Baker, New York Law Journal, Dec. 14, 1967, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (although cash part
of settlement was motivated by one particular cause of action, it was indivisible part of entire
settlement).
s Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 35-36 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582
(9th Cir., July 29, 1968); see Stull v. Kaymarq Consol. Corp., CCH FED. Suc. L. Rip. 5 92,508
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1969) (in action combining representative and derivative claims, court approved
settlement of representative claims while permitting outright dismissal of derivative claims as
lacking prospect of success).
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for a representative compromise designed to settle the claims of more than
one class. A single class may, for settlement purposes, be divided into subclasses, " ' which are accorded different settlement benefits depending on the
relative merits of their claims;... but if the claims are of equal merit the
court will not tolerate discrimination in favor of individual class members based solely on their superior bargaining power." '

Conditions for the Effectiveness of the Settlement. The settlement stipulation regularly provides that it is subject to the court's approval and will
promptly be submitted to the court. The agreement outlines the terms
of the judgment to be entered in case of approval: It declares the settlement to be fair and reasonable and directs its consummation according to
its terms; the action and all claims which have been or could have been
asserted therein on the basis of the facts alleged are dismissed on the merits
and with prejudice to the plaintiff, to the beneficiary corporation (or the
class) and to all its stockholders; 72 the court reserves jurisdiction over the
consummation of the settlement and the allowance of the plaintiff's litigation expenses, including reasonable legal and accounting fees. It is
customary to provide that the settlement shall not be consummated until
the judgment of approval becomes final through the exhaustion of appeals
or the expiration of the appeal time.
An additional condition frequently calls for the final dismissal of any
companion suits before the settlement is consummated.7 2 This provision
is advisable even if at the time of the settlement agreement no companion
suit is pending, for the public notice of the settlement hearing sometimes
stimulates other shareholders to bring independent suits on the claims to be
compromised.27 ' Once the settlement is judicially approved, the defendants
usually can secure the summary dismissal of all companion suits on the
strength of res judicata and release, but sometimes the dismissal is vigorously opposed. ' The clause here discussed then protects the defendants
209 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (4), as amended.
270 Stull v. Kaymarq Consol. Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.

92,508 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1969);
Wittner v. Ghen, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,502 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1969); Barnes v. Osofsky,
254 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), afl'd, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967) (class of defrauded
purchasers of securities was divided into subclasses depending upon dates of purchase); Fox v.
Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1010-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (in settlement of securities fraud
class suit, defrauded pledgees were allowed smaller fraction of their claims than defrauded purchasers because of legal doubts affecting pledgees' claims); Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401,
165 A.2d 741 (Ch. 1960) (preferential treatment of voting compared to nonvoting stock).
271 Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48,
52-53 (D. Mass. 1963) (in
settlement of securities fraud class suit, defendants agreed to pay $5 million to class plus $300,000
to three largest class members, who refused to join the settlement without the special payment;
court required the $300,000 to be added to the general settlement fund).
272 Because of the restrictive interpretation of the phrase "with prejudice" in Brown v.
Bullock,
17 App. Div. 2d 424, 235 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1962), motion to dismiss afipeal denied, 13 N.Y.2d 667,
191 N.E.2d 666, 241 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1963), the cumulative use of the words "on the merits and
with prejudice" is advisable.
272The judicial consideration of the settlement is not prevented by the pendency of companion
suits in other courts. Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 342, 350-51, 43 A.2d 721, 724-25
(Ch. 1945), afl'd, 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47 A.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808
(1947).

'74See, e.g., Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966); Rome v. Archer,
41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
.. See, e.g., Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954), rehearing denied, 221 F.2d 115
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from paying for the discharge of claims which they are still forced to defend in the companion suit.
The settlement stipulation will also provide that the compromise and
all releases thereunder shall be void if the settlement is disapproved by the
court or is for any other reason not consummated. In that event, neither
the fact of the compromise nor anything said or done in the settlement
proceedings may later be invoked as an admission against interest.
It is not customary to set a time limit for the approval or consummation
of the settlement. The settlement proceedings may take longer than anticipated; if the compromise is in the best interest of the class or corporation-as the parties usually represent it is-it would be of doubtful propriety to impose a deadline for the court's action.7 The court may, however, in its discretion permit either or both sides to withdraw from the
settlement."7
The Fee Agreement. The settlement stipulation usually provides that upon
its judicial approval the plaintiffs, their counsel and accountants may apply
to the court for the allowance of their litigation expenses, including legal
and accounting fees, in such amounts as the court may award.78 The allowance will ordinarily be assessed against the class or corporation which is
to receive the settlement benefits, but sometimes the "real" defendants
agree to pay the assessment. Although agreements of this kind have been
criticized,' they increase the net benefits of the settlement and are, therefore, generally sanctioned and encouraged.'
Can the parties agree on the amount of the counsel fee? Prior to
adoption of the Federal Rules such agreements were held to be permissible
and binding, at least if the fee was not grossly excessive. 8 ' Under Rule 23
the requirement of court approval and class notice extends to the fee
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955); Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168
(D. Del. 1966).
.. See Evans v. 2168 Broadway Corp., 281 N.Y. 34, 40, 22 N.E.2d 152, 154 (1939); Detroit
Trust Co. v. Mason, 309 Mich. 281, 307-08, 15 N.W.2d 475, 483 (1944). In System Meat Co. v.
Stewart, 175 Neb. 387, 122 N.W.2d 1 (1963), the settlement agreement was conditioned on
judicial approval within three days; in reversing the lower court's approval and remanding the
settlement for further hearings, the appellate court simply disregarded this condition.
2.7 Sorin v. Shahmoon, 7 App. Div. 2d 895, 182 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1959); Lewis v. Katz, New
York Law Journal, June 26, 1958, at 3, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.).
278 See note 165 supra.
279 Josephson v. Campbell, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,347 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1969):
Despite the criticism of the fee agreement, the court approved the settlement. Ultimately it
awarded the fees in the manner and amount agreed upon among the parties. Josephson v. Campbell,
No. 68 Civ. 1356 and 1455 (S.D.N.Y., May 1, 1969, Wyatt, J.). See also Rogers v. Hill, 34
F. Supp. 358, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
280Lessac v. Television-Electronics Fund, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,305
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., No. 64 Civ. 3478 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 12, 1968,
Wyatt, J.); Glicken v Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Grossman v. Playboy Clubs
Int'l, Inc., No. 882,939 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Jan. 16, 1969, at 12, Selber, J.);
Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49, 57 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Elster v. Dreyfus, '66-'67
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 290 N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div.
1968); Rosenfeld v. Richardson, New York Law Journal, May 31, 1962, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.);
Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
...Ashley v. Keith Oil Corp., 73 F. Supp. 37, 51 (D. Mass. 1947); Rogers v. Hill, 34 F.
Supp. 358, 362-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Karasik v. Pacific E. Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 180 A. 604, 612
(Ch. 1935); see Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 342, 356, 43 A.2d 721, 728 (Ch. 1945),
aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47 A.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947) (counsel
fees to be determined by arbitration but not to exceed 20 per cent of the settlement).
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agreement. 82 This is plainly so if the agreement is part of the settlement
proper but seems to be equally true if it is not.282 Consequently the court
is not bound to award a fee in the amount set by the parties, 4 although
consent by an independent board of the beneficiary corporation may be
In effect, the fee agreement thus amounts
given considerable weight.'
simply to a promise by plaintiff's counsel to apply for no more than the
specified amount, and a promise by the beneficiary corporation to support
or, at least, not to oppose the application. Frequently the agreement is
couched in precisely these terms. "
Even with the fee agreement thus limited, its propriety has been questioned,8 7 and it does, indeed, lend itself to possible abuse. The plaintiff's
counsel might accept a less desirable settlement in return for the corporation's promise to support a larger fee. A fair settlement offer might fail of
acceptance because one side insists on a fee deal unacceptable to the other. 88
There are, however, countervailing considerations of some weight. The
beneficiary corporation has a legitimate interest in knowing the prospective
costs of the compromise before accepting it; it should, therefore, be allowed
to ask for a ceiling on the plaintiff's fee demands. Before the plaintiff consents to the ceiling he should, in fairness, be permitted to ask for a floor.
Fee agreements are thus the product of the economic realities of the settlement process, have become quite customary, and are generally tolerated. "
An absolute prohibition against such agreements might well tend to promote secret fee understandings. It seems better to sanction open fee agreements and to curb possible abuses through the judicial control of the
amount of the allowance.
State law and corporate charters often provide that directors and officers,
when sued for an alleged breach of duty, are entitled to reimbursement of
their litigation expenses by the corporation unless the judgment in the
action finds them at fault. " Since the settlement of a stockholder's action
282

Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
283See Cunningham v. English, 269 F.2d 539, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (in class suit against
union, interlocutory consent order, so far as it directed union to pay plaintiffs' counsel fees, required
class notice and court approval).
284 Stull v. Kaymarq Consol. Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,508 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1969);
Blau v. Berkey, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,264 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Blau v. Brown,
'67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,263 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Blau v. Reidy, '67-'69 CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 5 92,192 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Kors v. United Whelan Corp., '57-'61 CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 5 90,970 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Blau v. Allen, 171 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Krinsky
v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 561-62, 156 A.2d 90, 95 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
282Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 561-62, 156 A.2d 90, 95 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
28
Id.; Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., No. 64 Civ. 3478 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 12, 1968, at 2,
Wyatt, J.); Blau v. Allen, 171 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Grossman v. Playboy Clubs Int'l,
Inc., No. 882,939 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, settlement stipulation, May 2, 1968,
8, approved Jan. 16, 1969, Selber, J.).
287 Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 36 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582
(9th Cir., July 29, 1968); Josephson v. Campbell, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,347
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1969). But see the later decision in that case, Josephson v. Campbell, No. 68
Civ. 1356 and 1455 (S.D.N.Y., May 1, 1969, Wyatt, J.).
288 See Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 45 F. Supp. 524, 530 (N.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd, 141
F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944).
28.Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 561-62, 156 A.2d 90, 95 (Sup. Ct. 1959); see notes
284, 286, 287 supra.
288
See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 721-26 (McKinney 1963).
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hardly ever includes such a finding, 9' it automatically gives the defendant
directors and officers the right of reimbursement29. unless, as sometimes
happens, the settlement stipulation expressly excludes the right."'3
VIII.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SETTLEMENT HEARING

Once the settlement stipulation is executed, it is submitted to the court
for its approval, together with a request for a hearing on its fairness. The
application, frequently in the form of a proposed consent order, is usually
supported by an affidavit of plaintiff's counsel summarizing the nature
of the action, the proceedings taken, and the reasons for the compromise."'
If the court finds that the settlement deserves consideration, it directs a
hearing and provides for notice to the interested stockholders.'
The Stage of the Litigation. In a representative (as distinguished from derivative) class suit, the court will ordinarily entertain the settlement only
upon a determination previously or simultaneously rendered that the
action is maintainable as a class suit.9 7 Subject to this requirement, a class
suit settlement can be submitted to the court at any stage of the litigation,
even after final decision or judgment.99 Correspondingly, a compromise
reached after judgment requires court approval and class notice no less
than one made at an earlier point."'
If a settlement is reached while the action is pending on appeal from a
final judgment, Rule 23 might at first blush appear inapplicable since the
Federal Rules govern only proceedings in the district courts.' For this
" The settlement stipulation usually includes a disclaimer of wrongdoing and liability on the
part of the defendants.
...If the settlement stipulation so provides, the court may fix the amount of the reimbursement. Josephson v. Campbell, No. 68 Civ. 1356 and 1455 (S.D.N.Y., May 1, 1969, Wyatt, J.).
...See, e.g., Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Rosenfeld v. Richardson,
New York Law Journal, May 31, 1962, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.); Beeber v. Empire Power Corp.,
31 N.Y.S.2d 914, 917 (Sup. Ct. 1941). The absence of such a provision is no ground for an
objection to the settlement. Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 809, 813-14 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).
294 The customary representation by counsel that the settlement is in the best interest of the
class or corporation may be omitted in special circumstances. Thus in Armstrong v. Doyle, New
York Law Journal, July 27, 1961, at 5, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.), modified and afl'd, 16 App. Div. 2d
916, 229 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1962), foreign governmental pressure compelled a settlement early in the
litigation. Plaintiff's counsel reserved his recommendation of approval or rejection until after the
hearing on the fairness of the settlement.
95 The court may engage in a preliminary review of the compromise and require changes in
form; but no case has been found in which, at this stage, the settlement was rejected for inadequacy.
In Naitove v. Morrow, New York Law Journal, Nov. 2, 1940, at 1386, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
260 App. Div. 1017, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1940), the court directed a settlement hearing despite
objections by five of the six plaintiffs to the adequacy of the compromise.
9
. For a summary of a typical order, see Kerner v. Crossman, 211 F. Supp. 397, 398 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1), as amended; see Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
...Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 494-95, modified, 48 F. Supp. 500
(S.D.N.Y. 1942); Hollander v. Mascuch, 137 N.J. Eq. 17, 43 A.2d 272 (Ch. 1945); Hollander v.
132 N.J. Eq. 376, 28 A.2d 298 (Ch. 1942).
Mascuch,
29 9
But see Chlupsa v. Posvic, 113 F.2d 375, 376-77 (7th Cir. 1940) (a judgment secured on
behalf of a national bank in a creditors' representative action could be settled by the receiver of
the bank, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 192 (1964), without compliance with Rule 23 and without
notice to the class).
800 FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
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reason, as shown above,"' the voluntary dismissal of a class suit appeal is
not embraced by the Rule. A settlement at the appeal stage, however,
presents different considerations. While the dismissal of an appeal has a
fairly routine character and leaves the class rights as the lower court has
determined them,a"' a settlement during appeal modifies the lower court's
judgment. Such a change, and the necessary evaluation of the merits of
the settlement, should not be left to the class plaintiff without judicial
supervision. The grounds for such supervision are no less persuasive on
appeal than in the earlier stages of the litigation. A settlement during appeal should, therefore, require court approval on notice to the class. As a
practical matter, an appellate court is not equipped to conduct a settlement
hearing and will, therefore, remand the proceedings to the trial court to
pass on the fairness of the compromise."'
Appointment of a Master or Referee. The court may refer the settlement
hearing in the first place to a master or referee. In the federal courts and
in Delaware this happens rarely,'"* but the New York state courts direct a
reference in the great majority of cases. A New York referee is usually
appointed to "report" on, rather than to "determine," the fairness of the
compromise. He hears and reports the evidence, but his findings and recommendations do not bind the court.' Upon receiving the referee's report, the court conducts a hearing of its own at which the stockholders
may be heard and at which the court may confirm, modify or reject the
report or send the case back to the referee for further findings or hearings." In actual experience an outright rejection is rare.
The reference is designed to relieve the court of the necessity to hear
and sift voluminous evidence. It is not too readily apparent, however, why
such a delegation of the judicial responsibility should be more appropriate
for a settlement hearing than for a trial. It may, indeed, be less so. Since
one of the purposes of a settlement is to avoid the burden and expense of
a full-fledged trial, the settlement hearing ought to be less searching and
exhaustive than a trial;..7 consequently, there is less need to lighten the
work load of the court. In fact, the referee's natural desire to carry out
"'l Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at 788-89.
3 2 Id.

'0' Wolf v. Nazareth Enterprises, Inc., 303 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1962), indicated, but without actually deciding, that during the pendency of an appeal the district court could not approve
a compromise without permission of the court of appeals. In Chlupsa v. Posvic, 113 F.2d 375,
376 (7th Cir. 1940), the court of appeals, without discussing the point, affirmed a district court
order approving, without prior appellate court permission, the compromise of a judgment while
an appeal therefrom was pending. See also Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 94
(Sup. 4 Ct. 1952).

a See, e.g., Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) provides that a reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. See Howes Leather Co.
v. LaBuy, 226 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
asN.Y.

Cv.

PRAC.

LAW

&

R.

4001,

4201,

4212,

4311,

4320

(McKinney

1963);

4

J.

H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 55 4001.6, 4212.05 (M.
Waxner ed. 1968).
30, For a remand to the referee, see, e.g., Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc. 2d 648, 241 N.Y.S.2d 642,
655 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Sorin v. Shahmoon, New York Law Journal, Jan. 7, 1968, at 17, col. 4
(Sup. Ct.).
...See text accompanying notes 371-78, 449-60 infra.
WEINSTEIN,
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his mandate to the full may tend to result in lengthier proceedings and
thus to counteract one of the aims of the compromise."'
The Notice to Stockholders. The order setting a hearing on the compromise usually provides also for the requisite notice to the stockholders. It
prescribes the text, method and timing of the notice in considerable detail
and frequently recites that the notice, if issued in compliance with the
order, shall be deemed adequate.
The notice informs the stockholders that they may show cause at the
hearing why the settlement should not be approved and that they may
present evidence pertinent to that issue."'9 It describes very briefly the nature of the action and of the defenses, the relevant proceedings and, in
more detail, the terms of the settlement."' An exhaustive description of
the pleading and evidence is neither feasible nor necessary. 1 ' The notice, it
has been held, need not eliminate all occasion for diligence on the part of
the stockholders. 12 The stockholders should, however, be advised that the
pleadings, depositions, exhibits and other proceedings as well as the settlement stipulation are on file with the court and may be inspected. A local
district court rule in New York also requires disclosure in the notice of the
amount which the plaintiffs will seek as their allowance;"' somewhat inconsistently, the amount to be paid to the defendant directors and officers
"0 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Doyle, New York Law Journal, July 27, 1961, at 5, col. 5 (Sup.
Ct.), modified and aff'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 916, 229 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1962) (2766 pages of hearings
and 504 exhibits, in addition to extensive depositions and hearings before the SEC); Zenn v.
Anzalone, 17 Misc. 2d 897, 191 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (Sup. Ct. 1959), appeal dismissed, 11 App.
Div. 2d 938, 210 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1960) (35 hearing days, 18 witnesses, 4600 pages of testimony,
480 exhibits); Silverstein v. Clarkson, 194 Misc. 1046, 88 N.Y.S.2d 67, 71 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
Despite his extensive labors, the referee in Zenn v. Anzalone, supra, became subject to criticism
and attack. See Smith v. Alleghany Corp., 394 F.2d 381 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 939
(1968).
109 In Sorin v. Shahmoon, New York Law Journal, Jan. 7, 1958, at 17, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.),
the notice failed to advise the stockholders of their right to object and omitted to describe the
terms of the settlement. Nevertheless, the court sustained the sufficiency of the notice on the
grounds that the reference therein to a "hearing" implied the right to object and that the stockholders had adequate opportunity to familiarize themselves with the settlement terms. Both rulings
appear questionable. See also note 310 infra.
a3Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953);
Kerner v. Crossman, 211 F. Supp. 397, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Fistel v. Christman, 133 F. Supp.
300, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (notice which does not describe the nature of the action may be insufficient); Prince v Bensinger, 244 A.2d 89, 92 (Del. Ch. 1968); Silverstein v. Clarkson, 194
Misc. 1046, 88 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (Sup. Ct. 1949). But see Sorin v. Shahmoon, New York Law
Journal, Jan. 7, 1958, at 17, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.).
"'The customary notice does not exceed three to four pages. But see the 19-page notice
in Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 494, modified, 48 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y.
1942).
"'Braun v. Fleming-Hall Tobacco Co., 33 Del. Ch. 246, 92 A.2d 302, 309 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
Prince v. Bensinger, 244 A.2d 89, 92 (Del. Ch. 1968) (notices are not tested by the stringent
rules applicable to prospectuses); Sonnino v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., New York Law Journal,
June 20, 1961, at 11, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) (notice need not recite all relevant and material facts
which might be offered at the trial, provided that it is accurate and reasonably calculated to
inform the shareholder of his rights).
.a Civil Rule 11 for the Southern & Eastern Districts of New York. See, e.g., Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REx'.
92,315 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Molybdenum
Corp. of America v. International Mining Corp., 32 F.R.D. 415, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). But see
Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 561-62, 156 A.2d 90, 95 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (notice stated
that plaintiff's counsel would apply for compensation; amount need not be set forth); Risack v.
Breuchaud, New York Law Journal, July 1, 1955, at 3, col. 7 (Sup. Ct.) (amount not set forth).
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for their litigation expenses"' need not be revealed. The notice frequently
requires objections to the settlement to be served on the parties in advance
of the hearing. 15 If the class members are entitled to "opt out" of the
class, 1' the requisite notice of that right, unless previously given, may be
combined with the settlement notice. 1 '
In derivative cases, the notice is usually issued and paid for by the beneficiary corporation. At times this burden is assumed by one of the real defendants,"' and that is the prevailing practice in representative actions.
The method of notifying the stockholders varies with the circumstances.
If their identity is known or easily ascertainable, they ought to be notified by mail.' In derivative actions the notice is, therefore, ordinarily
sent to the stockholders of record."' Although many shares may be held in
"street names," the beneficial owners, whose identity is usually unknown,
are not entitled to additional notice; it is the very purpose of stock registration to enable the corporation to deal with its stockholders on the basis
of its stock records. By contrast, many representative actions, such as those
brought on behalf of defrauded purchasers of stock, do not involve the
relationship between the corporation and its stockholders as such. In cases
of that kind, notice by publication may and perhaps must be added to the
notice by mail,"' since publication is the only means of notice where the
identity of the class members is unknown.' Publication alone is sometimes
permitted where the modest amount of the settlement does not warrant
the expense of mailing individual notices." On occasion-particularly in
actions under the federal securities laws-the court may also require no'14See text accompanying notes 290-93 supra.
92,508 (S.D.N.Y.
s1 See, e.g., Stull v. Kaymarq Consol. Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
Nov. 3, 1969); Lessac v. Television-Electronics Fund, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,305 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
'6FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2), as amended.
317See, e.g., Wittner v. Ghcn, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,502 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1969);
Heilbrunn v. Hanover Equities Corp., No. 65 Civ. 3282 (S.D.N.Y., order of Dec. 18, 1968, Wyatt,
J.); Bauer v. Clark, No. 64 C 112(3) (E.D. Mo., order of Nov. 8, 1967, Regan, J.).
'See, e.g., Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
"'Birnbaum v. Birrell, 17 F.R.D. 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
"2 See, e.g., Josephson v. Campbell, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,347 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24,
1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,315 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Neuwirth v. Allen, '61-'64 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,324 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 338 F.2d
2 (2d Cir. 1964) (in security holders' action under § 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,
the original notice to the stockholders was given by mail; supplemental notice of the adjourned
hearing date was given by newspaper publication to all security holders); Birnbaum v. Birrell, 17
F.R.D. 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Silverstein v. Clarkson, 194 Misc. 1046, 88 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
...See, e.g., Geller v. Bohen, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,429 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1969);
Ferraioli v. Cantor, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,336 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1969); Mersay
v. First Republic Corp. of America, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,304 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967);
Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
a"Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
32SBlau v. Brown, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,263 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Blau v. Allen,
171 F. Supp. 669, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Pottish v. Divak, 71 F. Supp. 737, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
See also Blau v. Berkey, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,264 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (since the
claim in suit amounted to only $9030.97 and was paid in full, the court "waived" class notice
and hearing altogether); Hutchison v. Bernhard, 220 A.2d 782 (Del. Ch. 1965) (notice of proposed dismissal of class suit to be enclosed with corporation's next mailing to its stockholders).
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tice to other security holders," to the Securities and Exchange Commission

or to other agencies."
The length of the period between notice and hearing is left to the court's
discretion. The customary thirty days.. would seem barely sufficient to
allow for correspondence between distant stockholders and local counsel,
examination of the court files, analysis of the case and the settlement terms,
and preparation of opposing papers and evidence. Nevertheless, provisions
for shorter periods of notice are not infrequent and have been sustained or
have passed without objection."'
If the initial hearing is to be conducted before a master or referee, it
has become frequent practice to issue the notice after completion of the
reference although before the court hearing."8 This is designed to aid the
stockholders' evaluation of the settlement by making the referee's report
available to them. The procedure will not, however, necessarily achieve its
aim. If because of the postponement of the notice no objectors appear before the referee, he might be tempted, despite his duty of independent exploration, to rely in large measure on the presentation and evidence of the
proponents of the compromise. As a consequence there is danger that his
report may not offer the rounded picture necessary for the guidance of
the stockholders and of the court.' Notice in advance of the reference
hearing appears, therefore, preferable.
Rule 23 does not prescribe the consequences of a compromise approved
without notice or upon inadequate notice. In one case, the alleged insufficiency of the notice was held on appeal to be harmless because the
absent stockholders were adequately represented by objectors who actually
appeared and vigorously opposed the settlement.' The notice, however, is
mandatory;' its purpose is not only to insure a full debate of the merits
of the settlement for the better information of the court, but to give every
34 Neuwirth v. Allen, '61-'64 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,324 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 338 F.2d
2 (2d Cir. 1964) (action under § 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
25 Josephson v. Campbell, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,347 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1969);
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,315 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Blau v. Allen, 171 F. Supp. 669, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Heddendorf v. Goldfinc, 167 F. Supp. 915,
924 (D. Mass. 1958); Pottish v. Divak, 71 F. Supp. 737, 739-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
326 See, e.g., Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832
(1953); Silverstein v. Clarkson, 194 Misc. 1046, 88 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (five weeks).
But see Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (55 days).
92,305
.2 Lessac v. Television-Electronics Fund, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (objections to be filed 24 days after mailing of notice); Kerner v. Crossman,
211 F. Supp. 397, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (23 days notice); Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553,
561, 156 A.2d 90, 95 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (20 days notice; referring to earlier instances of short
notice).
.8 Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137, 138-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc. 2d

648, 241 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Sorin v. Shahmoon, New York Law Journal, Jan. 7,
1958, at 17, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.); Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (Sup.
Ct. 1952). See also the New York state court settlements referred to in Abramson v. Pennwood
Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 761 (2d Cir. 1968); Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168,
172 (D. Del. 1966); Lifmann v. Aronson, 42 Del. Ch. 46, 203 A.2d 252, 255 (Ch. 1964), rev'd
on other grounds, 42 Del. Ch. 367, 212 A.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
". In Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc. 2d 648, 241 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1963), and Sorin v.
Shahmoon, New York Law Journal, Jan. 7, 1958, at 17, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.), the settlements were
remanded to the referee in order to hear the objecting stockholders.
'3Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).
Pittston Co. v. Reeves, 263 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1959); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F.
...
Supp. 255, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Cross v. Oneida Paper Prods. Co., 117 F. Supp. 919, 921 (D.N.J.
1964).
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stockholder the right to be heard.3"' That right may well have constitutional due process dimensions."' It would seem to follow that, on appeal
from a judgment of approval, the lack or insufficiency of the notice is a
ground for reversal and that the appellate court, as guardian of the absent
class members, ought, on its own motion, to review the propriety of the
notice. In the absence of due notice, a stockholder who was ignorant of the
settlement proceedings may move under Federal Rule 60 (b) to vacate the
judgment of approval;334 alternatively, it seems, he may disregard the
judgment and prosecute his own action on the claims purportedly settled."'

The Stay of Companion Suits. The order for the settlement hearing frequently provides that, until the conclusion of the settlement proceedings,
all class members are enjoined from instituting or further prosecuting any
action based on the claims being compromised. The utility of such a blan-

ket injunction is evident. The continued pressure of companion suits
could seriously jeopardize the settlement, for the court would be reluctant
to give consideration to a compromise which might be frustrated by a
judgment in a companion suit, and the defendants might not wish to be
tied to the settlement if they must at the same time undergo the risk and

burden of litigation on the merits in another forum. Comparable injunctions are often included in orders for the consolidation of stockholders'
suits."

The effectiveness of this kind of blanket injunction is not beyond question. Under Federal Rule 65 (d), an injunction "is binding only upon the
parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and at-

torneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with
them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or other-

wise." The members of a class of stockholders do not fit any of these categories. Class actions, it might perhaps be argued, should be treated as an
exception to the Rule; since the class members are bound by the final
judgment, they might also be amenable to a temporary injunction against

prosecuting suits of their own." ' But there are other obstacles to a sweeping
injunction. Under the Judicial Code,"3 8 a federal court cannot enjoin state
-2 Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944);
Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 493, modified, 48 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y.
1942).
.. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968) (notice of pendency
of class suit); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 327 (E.D. Pa.
1967) (notice of settlement hearing); Advisory Comm. Notes of 1966 to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 107

(1966).
334

Pittston Co. v. Reeves, 263 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1959).
83 See notes 512, 527 infra.
338Schiff v. Metzner, 331 F.2d 963, 964 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964);
Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 670 n.5 (2d Cir. 1961); Fields v. Wolfson, 41 F.R.D. 329,
330 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Zenn v. Anzalone, New York Law Journal, Feb. 19, 1957, at 6, col. 3
(Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 4 App. Div. 2d 945, 168 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1957).
3"Zenn v. Anzalone, New York Law Journal, Feb. 19, 1957, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.), appeal
dismissed, 4 App. Div. 2d 945, 168 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1957).
33828 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). This section forbids the federal courts to stay state court actions
already pending but does not preclude federal injunctions against the institution of new state
court proceedings. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965). See generally 1A J.
MooRE, FEOERAL PRACTICE 55 0.208-0.211 (2d ed. 1961); Developments in the Lasw-njunctions,
78 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1045-53 (1965); Note, Federal Power To Enjoin State Conrt Proceedings,
74 HARv. L. REv. 726 (1961).
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court actions, except on very stringent conditions. A state court, in turn,
cannot enjoin proceedings in a federal court," and a temporary injunction issued in one state might be hard to enforce in the courts of another.
The authorities on the subject are inconclusive. In Schiff v. Metzner'"
the Second Circuit did not reach the crucial questions of the binding effect
of a blanket injunction on other courts or of the availability of contempt
penalties against non-parties disobeying the injunction. In Ferguson v.
4
both the district court and the court of appeals avoided the issue
BirrellP
by a narrow interpretation of the state court's blanket injunction. In Zenn
v. Anzalone' a lower New York state court did hold that its blanket
injunction was violated by the institution and prosecution of a federal
suit, but since the court refrained from imposing a contempt penalty, its
decision was held not appealable. The effects of a broad injunction against
companion class suits are thus still an open question.
Despite its usefulness, the blanket injunction may be too blunt a weapon for indiscriminate use. Its major weakness is that the non-party class
members who are to be enjoined have no opportunity to be heard. They
may have valid objections to the injunction, but the settlement court will
be unaware of them. The responsibility for staying a companion suit
should, therefore, more appropriately be left to the court in which that
suit is pending. " Once that court learns of the pendency of the settlement
it will ordinarily issue the stay without a mandate from the settlement
court, both as a matter of comity and because the further prosecution of
the companion action in the face of the impending res judicata of the
settlement would be wasteful." Special circumstances may, however, argue
against a stay, and in that case the exercise of the companion court's discretion on an individualized basis should not be foreclosed by a broadside
injunction from the settlement court. Thus in Kahan v. Rosenstiel3 a federal court refused the stay of a companion suit pending before it because
the decision in the pending state court action could not operate as res
judicata in the federal suit. In Ferguson v. Birrell3 a federal court reached
a similar result, regardless of res judicata considerations, because the compromise pending in the state court appeared suspect. Perhaps the denial
of the stay was intended as a warning signal to the state court, or perhaps
it was designed to give the federal plaintiff an opportunity to gather evidence for a collateral attack on the state settlement if it should be ap.. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964); Note, State Court Power To Enjoin
Federal Court Proceedings, 59 Nw. U.L. Ruv. 832 (1965).
340331 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
341 190 F. Supp. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), aff'd sub nora. Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d
665, 4 672 (2d Cir. 1961).
a 'New York Law Journal, Feb. 19, 1957, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 4 App.
Div. 2d 945, 168 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1957).
3"
See Borden v. Adams, 7 App. Div. 2d 715, 180 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1958).
44
. Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 173 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1959), vacated as moot, 273
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Milvy v. Sperry Corp., 36 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Bruer v.
Laighton, New York Law Journal, Oct. 4, 1950, at 696, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.).
3 285 F. Supp. 61 (D. Del. 1968). See also Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed, No. 23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.), cert. denied,
351

U.S. 697 (1956), discussed in text accompanying notes 515-23 infra.
190 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665

346

Cir. 1961).

(2d

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

proved. The settlement court ought not to try, or to be able, to stifle
such a disposition. It would seem better to dispense with the blanket injunction altogether or to treat it, insofar as non-parties are concerned,
only as an appeal for the issuance of a stay by the court in which the companion suit is pending.
IX.

THE STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OR REJECTION OF THE SETTLEMENT

The approval of a settlement rests in the discretion of the court. 7 The
discretion, of course, is not an arbitrary but a judicial one, a "reasoned
judgment;""'4 it can be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion or legal
error. " The ultimate test for its exercise is the interest of the class or
corporation. A compromise will be approved as "fair," "reasonable" and
"adequate" if it serves that interest."' Since substantially the same test
governs the requisite judicial approval of the settlement of bankruptcy
claims,' authorities from the stockholder and the bankruptcy fields are
often cited interchangeably in both areas of the law."
The basic rule of fairness is supplemented by a variety of general maxims, not all of which are wholly free of mutual contradiction. The proponents of a compromise have the burden of proving its fairness."' The court

is the guardian of the absent class members; it is called a "third party to
the compromise," comparable to an independent board of directors."

It

"" Florida Trailer & Equip. Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1960); Ladd v. Brickley,
158 F.2d 212, 215 (1st Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 819 (1947); Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d
606, 612 (2d Cir. 1946); Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 778 (1943); Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533, 535 (D.R.I 1953).
.4 Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 434, 441 (1968).
34) See notes 474, 475 infra.
"'Ashbach v. Kirtley, 289 F.2d 159, 163 (8th Cir. 1961); Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d
315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953); Schreiber v. Jacobs, 128 F. Supp. 44,
50 (E.D. Mich. 1955); Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533, 535 (D.R.I. 1953); Piccard v. Sperry
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 120 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1941); Dann v. Chrysler
Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 438, 198 A.2d 185, 201 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del.
Ch. 123, 205 A.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965); Waterman Corp. v.
Johnston, 106 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1073, 113 N.Y.S.2d 287,
288, appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 879, 109 N.E.2d 887 (1952); System Meat Co. v. Stewart, 163
N.W.2d 789, 792 (Neb. 1969).
"Bankruptcy
Act § 27, 11 U.S.C. § 50 (1964); 2 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 5 27.04 (J.
Moore & L. King eds. 1968); Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 647 (1964).
ssaSee, e.g., the references to bankruptcy cases in Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606, 614 (2d Cit.
1946); Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Shielcrawt v.
Moffett, 59 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621 (Sup. Ct. 1945); and the references to stockholder settlements in
Wolf v. Nazareth Enterprises, Inc., 303 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cit. 1962); Ashbach v. Kirtley, 289
F.2d 159, 163 (8th Cir. 1961). Rule 23 has been held to apply to the settlement of class disputes
in bankruptcy. In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 61 F. Supp. 11, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd,
149 3F.2d 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945).
" Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582
(9th Cir., July 29, 1968); Alleglhany Corp. v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
aff'd, 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cit. 1964), aff'd en banc, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed
sub nom. Holt v. Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966); Birnbaum v. Birrell, 17 F.R.D. 409, 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Schreiber v. Jacobs, 128 F. Supp. 44, 50 (E.D. Mich. 1955); Berger v. Dyson,
111 F. Supp. 533, 535 (D.R.I. 1953); Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741,
748 (Ch. 1960); Grossman v. Playboy Clubs Int'l, Inc., No. 882,939 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los
Angeles County, Jan. 16, 1969, at 3, Selber, J.).
"4 Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953);
Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582 (9th Cir.,
July 29, 1968); Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 926 (D. Mass. 1958); Rome v. Archer,
41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49, 53-54 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc. 2d 648, 241
N.Y.S.2d 642, 654 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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must, therefore, use its informed and independent business judgment, based
on careful judicial scrutiny, in passing on the fairness of the settlement." '
The policy of the law, however, favors settlements" and they are not to
be lightly rejected." The bird in hand is to be preferred to the flock in the
bush and a poor settlement to a good litigation.s" The court will not substitute its business judgment for that of the parties; "the only question...
is whether the settlement, taken as a whole, is so unfair on its face as to
preclude judicial approval.""" Whatever weight some or all of these abstract precepts may carry, the hard fact is that a great majority of stockholder settlements are judicially approved and rejections on the ground
of inadequacy are comparatively rare.
Other principles furnish more fruitful guidance. Reference has already
been made to some of the special requisites of a proper settlement.' The
cardinal task of the court, however, is to weigh the likelihood of recovery
in the action against the benefits of the compromise."' In making this assessment, the court will give at least some weight to the judgment of the
parties and their counsel and to the wishes of the stockholders at large.
These factors require further discussion.
The Likelihood of Recovery. No sane litigant would settle an action, and
no court would approve the settlement, if the success of the suit and the
355Wolf
v. Nazareth Enterprises, Inc., 303 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1962); Neuwirth v. Allen,
'61-'64 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,324 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 338 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1964); Goodman
v. Futrovsky, 42 Del. Ch. 468, 213 A.2d 899, 902 (Sup. Ct. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946
(1966); Gladstone v. Bennett, 38 Del. Ch. 391, 400, 153 A.2d 577, 583 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
asaWilliams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910); Florida Trailer & Equip. Co. v.
Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1960); Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953); Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49, 53 (Sup. Ct.
1964); Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc. 2d 648, 241 N.Y.S.2d 642, 654 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Zenn v. Anzalone, 17 Misc. 2d 897, 191 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (Sup. Ct. 1959), appeal dismissed, 11 App. Div.
2d 938, 210 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1960).
assJosephson v. Campbell, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,347 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1969);
Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582 (9th Cir.,
July 29, 1968).
"'Ladd v. Brickley, 158 F.2d 212, 220 (1st Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 819 (1947);
Lewis v. Rosenberg, '57-'61 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 90,856 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); In re Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 46 F. Supp. 95, 97 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
"' Wittner v. Ghen, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,502 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1969); Glicken v.
Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Similar formulations, but without reference to
the "face" of the settlement: Lessac v. Television-Electronics Fund, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 5 92,305 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 493, modified, 48 F.
Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
'E.g., adequate class representation (text accompanying notes 157-66 supra) and class notice
(text accompanying notes 330-35 supra); negotiation in good faith by proper party sufficiently
informed (text accompanying notes 171-78, 189-99 supra); permissible type of consideration and
release (text accompanying notes 206-11, 260-71 supra); equitable distribution of representative
settlement among class members (text accompanying notes 269-71 supra).
3" Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1968)
(basic is "the need to compare the terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of litigation"); Florida Trailer & Equip.
Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571, 573 (5th Cir. 1960); Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953); Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1946);
Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 52 (D. Mass. 1963); Winkelman v.
General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 493, modified, 48 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Prince
v. Bensinger, 244 A.2d 89, 93 (Del. Ch. 1968); Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 438, 198
A.2d 185, 201 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nona. Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch. 123, 205 A.2d 343
(Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965); System Meat Co. v. Stewart, 163 N.W.2d
789, 792 (Neb. 1969); Pearson v. Prospect Hill Apartments, Inc., 19 Misc. 2d 51, 195 N.Y.S.2d
471, 473 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Bysheim v. Miranda, 44 N.Y.S.2d 15, 23 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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amount of the recovery were certain. In Upson v. Otis"' the Second Circuit
reversed a stockholder settlement on the ground that the plaintiff's victory
and a recovery larger than the settlement were assured; the court added
that in an action against fiduciaries-such as most stockholders' suits are
-far more than a slight doubt concerning the recovery is necessary to
justify a compromise."' Stockholder litigation, however, is notably difficult
and unpredictable, and the ultimate recovery in Upson turned out to be
substantially less than the amount of the rejected compromise. 4 Understandably, therefore, the prevailing judicial attitude recognizes the problems besetting stockholders' suits" and displays a healthy skepticism in
the face of optimistic forecasts or large demands.' Quite apart from the
risks of the litigation itself, the uncertainty of collecting a prospective
judgment may likewise support the wisdom of substantial settlement concessions.'
Although the chances of success in a stockholder's suit cannot be reduced scientifically to a percentage formula, lawyers are used to assessing
their cases as good, fair or poor. The settlement court need not make a
more differentiated estimate, but some such evaluation of the probable merits of the action is essential, and it must rest on a rational appraisal of the
particular areas of doubt and uncertainty that affect the prognosis of recovery."
The presence of serious questions of law can afford a sufficient basis for
a compromise. 69 In an adversary contest, to be sure, the court must resolve
all material legal questions no matter how dubious, but it is under no such
duty in passing on a compromise, provided there is reasonable ground for a
difference of opinion.
The settlement court faces more difficult problems if the merits of the
case turn on disputed issues of fact. The court must then seek to reconcile
two seemingly inconsistent duties. One of them requires the court to delve
into the facts to ascertain the probable resolution of the issues. Evidence,
312 155 F.2d 606
55
aid.
4

(2d Cir. 1946).

at 614.
.. Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649, reaff'd, 169 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1948). Compare the rejection
of the settlement in Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 120 F.2d 328
(2d Cir. 1941), with the ultimate dismissal of the action, Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 48 F. Supp. 465
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 152 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1946).
36SFerguson v. Birrell, 190 F. Supp. 506, 509 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Ferguson
v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1961); Elster v. Dreyfus, '66-267 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5
91,914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 1051, 290 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1968); Silverstein
v. Clarkson, 194 Misc. 1046, 88 N.Y.S.2d 67, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
3S6Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 45 F. Supp. 524, 530 (N.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd, 141 F.2d
285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944); Forman v. Chesler, 39 Del. Ch. 484, 167 A.2d
442, 447 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Waterman Corp. v. Johnston, 106 N.Y.S.2d 813, 816 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1073, 113 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (1952), appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 879, 109
N.E.2d 887 (1952); Mann v. Luke, 82 N.Y.S.2d 725, 731-32 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
367 Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25, 434 (1968); Cohen v. Young, 127
F.2d 721, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 773 (1943); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp.,
273 F. Supp. 863, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Martin v. United Standard Oilfund, 30 F. Supp. 864
(S.D.N.Y. 1939).
...Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25, 434 (1968).
69
3 Ladd v. Brickley, 158 F.2d 212, 217-20 (Ist Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 819 (1947);
In re Prudence Co., 98 F.2d 559, 560 (2d Cir. 1938); Lessac v. Television-Electronics Fund, Inc.,
'67-'69 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,305 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533,
535 (D.R.I. 1953); Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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rather than mere argument of counsel, is then an indispensable requisite of
the settlement decision, and the lack of evidence or its inadequacy is perhaps the most frequent ground for the judicial rejection of a settlement."'
At the same time, however, the court's right and duty to take evidence
is limited. The very purpose of a compromise is to avoid the trial of sharpThe settlely disputed issues and to dispense with wasteful litigation.'
ment hearing, therefore, must not turn into a trial or a rehearsal of the
trial. "' The court is concerned with the likelihood of success or failure and
ought, therefore, to avoid any actual determination of the merits.' Accordingly, if the purpose of the settlement is not to be defeated, the court
should receive only enough proof to evaluate the chances of the litigation,
not to decide it."4 Too much evidence is hardly less of an evil than too
little.
The lines between too much and too little evidence cannot be drawn
with precision. As a minimum, the judge must apprise himself of "all facts
necessary for an intelligent and objective opinion,''. but that does not tell
him where to stop his inquiry. The more facts he has, the more "intelligent" will be his opinion, and yet there must be an early end to the inquiry
if the purpose of the compromise is not to be frustrated. Obviously the
court must have enough information to raise its decision above the level of
mere guesswork. How much further to go must largely be a matter of discretion, to be guided by balancing the probable usefulness of the additional
evidence against the burden in time and expense of securing and receiving
it.
In forecasting the likely outcome of the action, the court considers not
only the difficulties of proof and the uncertainties of the law but also juris70

E.g., Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25, 434 (1968); Ashbach v. Kirtley,

289 F.2d 159, 163-64 (8th Cir. 1961); Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606, 614-15 (2d Cit. 1946);
Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1943); Berger
v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D.R.I. 1953); Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp. 1006, 1009
(S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 120 F.2d 328 (2d Cit. 1941); Duane v. Menzies, 37 Del. Ch. 416, 144 A.2d 229,
233 (Ch. 1958).
"'.Florida Trailer & Equip. Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cit. 1960); In re Prudence
Co., 98 F.2d 559, 560 (2d Cir. 1938); Lessac v. Television-Electronics Fund, Inc.,'67-'69 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,305 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 59 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621 (Sup.
Ct. 1945).
" Schleiff
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Glicken v. Bradford,
35 F.R.D. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Neuwirth v. Allen, '61-'64 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5
91,324 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 338 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1964); Schreiber v. Jacobs, 128 F. Supp. 44, 50
(E.D. Mich. 1955); Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49, 53 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Prince
v. Bensinger, 244 A.2d 89, 93 (Del. Ch. 1968); Steigman v. Beery, 42 Del. Ch. 53, 203 A.2d 463,
468 (Ch. 1964); Waterman Corp. v. Johnston, 106 N.Y.S.2d 813, 816 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd,
279 App. Div. 1073, 113 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (1952), appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 879, 109 N.E.2d
887 (1952); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 144 P.2d 725" (1944). See alsoSchwartzman
v. Tenneco Mfg. Co., 375 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1967).
3 See cases at notes 371, 372 supra; In re Riggi Bros., 42 F.2d 174 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
noam. Woods & Selick, Inc. v. Todd, 282 U.S. 881 (1930); Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533, 535
(D.R.. 1953); Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741, 748-49 (Ch. 1960); Perrine
v. Pennroad Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47 A.2d 479, 488 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 329' U.S. 808
(1946); Lieferant v. Bartell, 36 Misc. 2d 477, 232 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc. 222, 39 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
4
" Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Schreiber v. Jacobs, 128 F.
Supp. 44, 50 (E.D. Mich. 1955); Spelfogel v. Baker, New York Law Journal, Dec. 14, 1967,-at
15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
a" Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968); Wolf v. Nazareth Enterprises,
Inc., 303 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cit. 1962).
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dictional and procedural hurdles,3" the weight of presumptions favoring
the defense 7" and other foreseeable obstacles to success."7
The Settlement Benefits. The benefits of the compromise should be a fair
equivalent of the corporate or class claims to be surrendered. The equation
must necessarily be rough; the court "cannot balance the scales with the
nicety of an apothecary..... Uncertainties of various degrees mark not only
the prospects of success in the action, but may also becloud the value of
the settlement consideration unless it takes the form of presently payable
cash. The types of permissible settlement benefits, as has been seen, are almost unlimited;... their value may range from "certain" to "probable" to
"speculative." The compromise must assure some advantage to the class or
corporation,"'1 but the speculative nature of the amount of the settlement
benefits does not necessarily prevent the approval of the compromise, particularly if the claims are doubtful." ' The court is not required to assign a
dollar valuation to the settlement.8 '
The extent to which evidence of the value of the settlement should be
required has been given scant consideration by the authorities, and it does
not seem practicable to formulate a general rule beyond the standard of
common sense. If the settlement consideration takes the form of shares of
stock or other assets... their market value should be shown. If a defendant
in a derivative action settles the claims against him by guaranteeing a loan
to the corporation,"' the court should at least be satisfied that the corporation is really in need of credit and cannot secure it without the defendant's
guaranty. A compromise reducing for a number of years the future compensation of a corporate executive or of the investment adviser of a mutual fund08 should be buttressed by evidence of circumstances which make
"78Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEc. L. REt. 5 92,315 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
377
Isaacs v. Focer, 39 Del. Ch. 105, 159 A.2d 295, 297-98 (Ch. 1960).
... Neuwirth v. Allen, '61-'64 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,324 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 338 F.2d
2 (2d Cir. 1964) (danger of retroactive SEC exemption for alleged violation of Investment Company Act).
"This phrase, coined in Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 59 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621 (Sup. Ct. 1945), has
been quoted frequently; e.g., Neuwirth v. Allen, '61-'64 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,324
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 338 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1964); Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 152 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Pearson v Prospect Hill Apartments, Inc., 19 Misc. 2d 51, 195 N.Y.S.2d 471, 473 (Sup. Ct.
1959); Zenn v. Anzalone, 17 Misc. 2d 897, 191 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (Sup. Ct. 1959), appeal dismissed, 11 App. Div. 2d 938, 210 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1960).
8a°See text accompanying notes 223-71 supra.
38 Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582 (9th
Cir., July 29, 1968); Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 438, 198 A.2d 185, 203-04 (Ch. 1963),
aff'd sub nom. Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch. 123, 205 A.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 973 (1965); Nadler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 427, 154 A.2d 146, 150 (Ch.
1959); Duane v. Menzies, 37 Del. Ch. 416, 144 A.2d 229 (Ch. 1958).
382 Roman v. Master Indus., Inc., '66-267 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,806 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 438,
198 A.2d 185, 203-04 (Ch. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch. 123, 205 A.2d
343 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965); Beeber v. Empire Power Corp., 31
N.Y.S.2d 914, 919 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
833Roman v. Master Indus., Inc., '66-'67 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,806 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Spelfogel v. Baker, New York Law Journal, Dec. 14, 1967, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). The loan
guaranty in Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 335-36 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
832 (1953) (note 231 supra), was obviously incapable of even approximate monetary evaluation.
84 See note 228 supra.
83 See note 231 supra.
8S$ee notes 234, 238 supra.
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it probable that the employment relation will continue to the end of the
settlement period."8 7 If claims between parent and subsidiary are settled by
the merger of the two corporations,"' expert evidence will normally be
needed to demonstrate that the merger is not only fair but makes due
allowance for the claims to be compromised.
Even if the court is armed with evidence of this kind, the adequacy of
the settlement benefits must largely remain a matter of the court's business
judgment. In the exercise of that judgment, however, the court is somewhat limited. It cannot trade with the defendants for better terms without
assuming a partisan role, nor can it divine whether the plaintiff has wrung
the last possible concessions from the defendants. It cannot insist, therefore, on a settlement that "hits the jackpot." The court will thus often be
inclined to approve a compromise reached by the parties in good faith and
at arm's length provided it does not fall below the lower range of what is
reasonable. The language of some of the cases even suggests that a settlement must be approved so long as it cannot be branded as "unfair." ' ' This
formulation appears unduly restrictive of the court's discretion. While an
unfair compromise should certainly be rejected, many settlements lie in a
penumbra between fairness and unfairness, and it is precisely this area in
which the court's exercise of business judgment ought to be given free
play. The judicial practice seems to favor this flexible approach.' °
If the court rejects a settlement as unreasonably low or otherwise unfair,
8 1
it may specify the improvements necessary to make it acceptable."
An outright rejection leaves the parties free, of course, to renegotiate the compromise and to submit the new terms to the court,' but a new hearing
upon a new notice to the class will then be necessary.
A change of circumstances between the time of the settlement agreement and the time of the court's decision may improve or impair the fairness of the compromise. For instance, the market price of the securities to
be given in settlement may rise or fall, or the corporate executive whose
future compensation is to be reduced may become disabled from performing further services. It seems that the conditions existing at the time of
the court's decision should control.''
38

See note 242 supra.

388 See note 2 55 supra.

Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Glicken v. Bradford,
35 F.R.D. 144, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 493,
modified, 48 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Kleinman v. Saminsky, 41 Del. Ch. 572, 576-77,
200 A.2d 572, 575 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 379, U.S. 900 (1964).
..8 In Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 493, modified, 48 F. Supp. 500
(S.D.N.Y. 1942), the court approved the proposed $4,000,000 settlement on condition that
$500,000 be added. Since this comparatively modest increase could hardly have made the difference between "fair" and "unfair," the court seems to have felt free to use its business judgment.
In Grossman v. Playboy Clubs Int'l, Inc., No. 882,939 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Jan.
16, 1969, at 3, Selber, J.), the court deemed the settlement "fair" as drawn by the parties;
nevertheless, it proposed changes, which the parties accepted.
a9 See cases at note 390 supra; Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48,
52-53 (D. Mass. 1963); Armstrong v. Doyle, New York Law Journal, July 27, 1961, at 5, col.
5 (Sup. Ct.), modified and aff'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 916, 229 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1962).
assUpson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1946); Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533,
534 (D.R.I. 1953) (referring to an earlier rejected settlement); Spelfogel v. Baker, New York
Law Journal, Dec. 14, 1967, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
193System Meat Co. v. Stewart, 163 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Neb. 1969); Lewis v. Katz, New York
388
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Among the benefits of almost every settlement is the relief from the
expenses and delay of further litigation, the diversion of the time of corporate officers, and the threatened harm to the corporation's credit and
goodwill. Standing alone, expediency and the desire to end troublesome litigation are not enough to support a settlement.89 They must be balanced
against the merits of the action but are treated as entitled to substantial
weight."5 Even a poor settlement may have to be approved if neither the
plaintiff nor any other class member is willing to bear the expense of further litigation, for the alternative would be the outright dismissal of the
action."' Extraneous factors, such as governmental pressure for a settlement, may likewise argue strongly for approval." '
The Support of the Settlement by Interested Persons. In passing on a settlement, the court listens to the views of interested persons-the plaintiff and
his lawyer, the directors and counsel of the beneficiary corporation, and the
members of the class. At times the court may also receive the advice of a
governmental agency such as the SEC. Their support or opposition may influence the court in varying degrees.
The plaintiff and his lawyer are normally the proponents of the compromise. Their wishes are obviously not controlling, but the endorsement
of the settlement by experienced and reputable counsel for plaintiff carries considerable weight, 9' and so does the consent of the plaintiff himself if
his sophistication, substantial stake and bargaining strength invest his judgment with authority."' On occasion a plaintiff or co-plaintiff may oppose
the compromise,' but the authorities do not seem to attribute greater persuasion to their adverse views than is justified by the intrinsic merits of

their arguments."
Law Journal, June 26, 1958, at 3, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.) (corporation which had agreed to pay the
settlement became insolvent). Contra, Spelfogel v. Baker, New York Law Journal, Dec. 14, 1967,
at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
94 Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 434 (1968); In re Chicago Rapid Transit
Co., 196 F.2d 484, 490-91 (7th Cit. 1952); Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1966). But see Hoffman v. Dann, 42 Del. Ch. 123, 205 A.2d 343, 352-53 (Sup. Ct.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965); Mann v. Luke, 82 N.Y.S.2d 725, 731-32 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
.. Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 141 F.2d 285, 288 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
739 (1944); Roman v. Master Indus., Inc., '66-'67 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,806 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533, 535-36 (D.R.I. 1953); Bosc v. 39 Broadway, Inc., 80
F. Supp. 825, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Heimann v. American Express Co., 53 Misc. 2d 749, 279
N.Y.S.2d 867, 884 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
...See Hcddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 925 (D. Mass. 1958).
.. Hollander v. Mascuch, 132 N.J. Eq. 376, 28 A.2d 298 (Ch. 1942); Armstrong v. Doyle,
New York Law Journal, July 27, 1961, at 5, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.), modified and aff'd, 16 App. Div.
2d 916, 229 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1963).
.. E.g., Ladd v. Brickley, 158 F.2d 212, 215 (1st Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 819
(1947); Wittner v. Ghen, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,502 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1969) ("strong
initial presumption of fairness"); Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175, 179 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Cherner v. Transitron
Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D. Mass. 1963); Gladstone v. Bennett, 38 Del. Ch. 391,
401, 153 A.2d 577, 583 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Waterman Corp. v. Johnston, 106 N.Y.S.2d 813, 816-17
(Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1073, 113 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288, appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y.
879, 109 N.E.2d 887 (1952).
.' Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,315 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D. Mass. 1963).
4
"See text accompanying notes 171-78, 184 supra.
40
See Waterman Corp. v. Johnston, 106 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 (Sup. Ct. 1951), afl'd, 279 App.
Div. 1073, 113 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288, appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 879, 109 N.E.2d 887 (1952).
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In a derivative suit there can be no compromise of the corporate claims
unless their owner, the corporation, acting through its board of directors,
joins in the settlement agreement. Inevitably, therefore, the board supports the settlement. Its backing has little, if any, persuasive force if the
directors are identified with the alleged wrongdoers, but it assumes considerable significance if the directors are independent and disinterested. In
fact, prior to the adoption of Federal Rule 23 and its state counterparts,
the business judgment of an independent board agreeing to a compromise
of a derivative suit was held to bind the court except in case of fraud.'
While great disparity between the value of the claims surrendered and the
settlement benefits was deemed a possible badge of fraud," ' this inference
was by no means inescapable. In Karasik v. Pacific Eastern Corp.4' an independent board approved a cheap settlement of a derivative action in the
honest but mistaken belief that the claims were worthless; although the
court assumed the likelihood of a large judgment in the action, it deemed
itself powerless to upset the board's decision. Occasional echoes of this extreme approach may still be heard under Rule 23, but they are inconsistent with the purpose of the Rule. That purpose, as noted, is to guard the interests of the corporation and its stockholders.0 " An inadequate compromise
reached by the directors, no matter how honestly, on the basis of a mistaken appraisal of the claims is not in the corporate interest. The court, by
training as well as through the information it gains at the hearing, is in a
superior position to assess the merits of the action. A doctrine compelling it,
nevertheless, to perpetuate the errors of disinterested but misguided directors would violate the spirit of the Rule. Moreover, one of the reasons for
adopting Rule 23 was that "in a stockholder's derivative suit . . . the good
faith of all parties before the court is uncertain."4 7" It would be mischievous
to divert the court's attention from the prospective merits of the action
to the collateral question of whether the new board of directors is indeed independent. The prevailing and better view, therefore, gives considerable
weight to the judgment of a board that appears independent but does not
treat it as conclusive. 8
The stockholders as a class rarely have an occasion to cast an organized
vote on a proposed compromise. When they do their decision is not bind402Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47 A.2d 479, 487-88 (Sup. Ct. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947); Karasik v. Pacific E. Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 180 A. 604, 611 (Ch.
1935); Mendelson Bros. Factors v. Sachs, 253 App. Div. 270, 1 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841, aff'd, 279
N.Y. 604, 17 N.E.2d 459 (1938).
4 05
Karasik v. Pacific E. Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 180 A. 604, 607 (Ch. 1935).
404180 A. at 610-11.
41 Schreiber v. Jacobs, 128 F. Supp. 44, 59-60 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
406 See note 350 supra.
40. McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder To Terminate a Stockholder's Suit, 46 YALE

L.J. 421, 435 (1936); see Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at notes 22-28.
4
.Birnbaum v. Birrell, 17 F.R.D. 409, 411-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Berger v. Dyson, 111 F.
Supp. 533, 535 (D.R.I. 1953); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 495,
modified, 48 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 45 F. Supp. 524,
529 (N.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd, 141 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944); Krinsky
v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 560, 156 A.2d 90, 94 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Bysheim v. Miranda, 44
N.Y.S.2d 15, 22 (Sup. Ct. 1943). But see Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 941 (1965), and text accompanying notes 545-60 infra.
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ing, °8 but the wishes of a majority that is free of adverse interests must
have a powerful impact on the court."' In Manacher v. Reynolds 1' a settlement in the form of a recapitalization and merger plan had received overwhelming stockholder approval; although the court thought that the plan
provided excessive benefits for the insiders, it deferred to the shareholders'
decision.
It is a different question whether the stockholders' failure to object is
tantamount to a tacit endorsement of the settlement. Courts are frequently
inclined to treat the absence or paucity of objectors as an element in favor
of approval."' Occasionally, the lack of opposition has been considered by
itself a sufficient basis for approval; 4"3 in one case the small number of objectors, coupled with the recommendation of the settlement by counsel
for the proponents, was held to create a "strong initial presumption that
the compromise is fair and reasonable. ' 4. This approach appears somewhat
unrealistic. The "lethargy, indifference or ignorance" of the stockholders
should not be treated as assent.1 As a matter of law, the silence of the
stockholders does not relieve the court of its duties to the absent members
of the class but adds to its responsibility to reach an independent and objective judgment.1
Since stockholder criticism of a proposed compromise is so often lacking or inadequate, it has been suggested that the help of administrative
agencies, such as the SEC, be made available to the courts. 7 In bankruptcy
reorganizations, which in large measure involve economic questions, the
SEC's assistance can indeed be of great value and is provided for by statute." Stockholder settlements, however, depend essentially on an appraisal
of the merits of the action, a task that lies within the traditional competence of the courts and rarely calls for specialized administrative expertise.
A shift of responsibility from court to agency does not, therefore, hold out
4°°Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 435 (1968); United States Lines, Inc. v.
United States Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1938).
418Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Prince v. Bensinger, 244 A.2d
89, 95-96 (Del. Ch. 1968); Bysheim v. Miranda, 44 N.Y.S.2d 15, 22 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
411 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741, 754-56 (Ch. 1960); Note, Corporations-Voting Stock in
Settlement of Suit for Dissolution of Holding Corporation May Demand Premium from Nonvoting
for Assent To Merge Holding With Operating Corporation, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 887 (1961).
412Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 141 F.2d 285, 288 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
739 (1944); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,315
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Berger v.
Dyson, 111 F. Supp. 533, 535 (D.R.I. 1953); Rosenfeld v. Richardson, New York Law Journal,
May 31, 1962, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.); Diamond v. Davis, 62 N.Y.S.2d 181, 186 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
4 3
Blau v. Allen, 171 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
414 Josephson v. Campbell, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 3 92,347 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1969).
41'Silverstein v. Clarkson, 194 Misc. 1046, 88 N.Y.S.2d 67, 71 (Sssp. Ct. 1949).
4"" Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 435 (1968); Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp.
29, 32 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582 (9th Cir., July 29, 1968); Heddendorf v.
Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 926 (D. Mass. 1958).
417
Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion of
Friendly, J.), aff'd en banc, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed sub nom. Holt v.
Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966); Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative
Suits, 42 COLUM. L. Rev. 574, 592-93 (1942). See the SEC's unsuccessful proposal to Congress
that. it be authorized by statute to investigate and report on the fairness of proposed settlements
of investment company claims against insiders. Note, Control over Settlement of Shareholders'
Suits, 54 HAsv. L. REv. 833, 839 (1941).
418Bankruptcy Act, ch. X, 5 172, 173, 208, 11 U.S.C. §§ 572, 573, 608 passim (1964).
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much promise for the better protection of the class interests."" In appropriate circumstances, of course, the court can and does ask for the SEC's
advice.. and, despite the absence of a statutory basis for the request, the
Commission is not known to have refused.
Under special statutory provisions, administrative action may completely displace the court approval required by Rule 23. Thus the claims involved in a derivative suit may be compromised, with SEC approval, as
part of a reorganization plan under section 11 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act;" 1 the compromise bars the further prosecution of the
derivative action."
X.

THE SETTLEMENT HEARING

The Procedure. The settlement hearing, as noted, is not a trial. ' The
court's task is not to decide the case on the merits but to reach an informed
business judgment of the adequacy of the compromise, based on the
chances of success or failure in the action and the likely value of the settlement benefits. The formal rules of evidence are not too well adapted to
this process of balancing probabilities. They may, therefore, be dispensed
with in the court's discretion."
Despite an early decision barring the use of affidavits at the settlement
hearing,"2 they are widely employed and accepted."' This accords with the
informality of the proceeding and is, moreover, authorized by Federal
Rules 6 (d) and 43 (e), which permit motions to be supported and opposed
by affidavits. Apart from affidavits, the bulk of the evidence usually consists of documents, depositions and answers to interrogatories; live testimony is by no means infrequent. If the court is not satisfied with the evidence offered by the parties, it may on its own motion call for more."
The colloquy of counsel cannot take the place of evidence," but even
this rule has been somewhat relaxed. In Neuwirth v. Allen" the court
429 See the suggestion, in the text accompanying notes 464-67 infra, to strengthen the adversary

nature of the settlement proceedings.
42
.See Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 31 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582
(9th Cir., July 29, 1968); Blau v. Brown, '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REI'.
92,263 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). See also note 325 supra.
421 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1964).

1953)
(1953);

In re Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 109 F. Supp. 522, 525

(with numerous citations),
In re United Gas Corp.,

afl'd, 204 F.2d 797 (3d Cir.),
58 F. Supp.

501,

512-14

(D.

Del.

cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865

(D. Del. 1944),

afl'd, 162 F.2d 409

(3d Cir. 1947).
4411
2 Auerbach v. Cities Serv. Co., 36 Del. Ch. 554, 134 A.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1957).

3 See note 372 supra.
4
" Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 19 (E.D. Mich. 1950), aff'd sub nom. Masterson v.
Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).

4' Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp. 1006, 1008 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 120 F.2d 328 (2d Cir.
1941).
4"E.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,315
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Heddendorf v.
Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 927 (D. Mass. 1958); Rosenfeld v. Richardson, New York Law
Journal, May 31, 1962, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.); Sorin v. Shahmoon, New York Law Journal,
Jan. 7, 1958, at 17, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.); Yaeger v. Phillips, New York Law Journal, Dec. 15,

1953,

at 1452, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.).
"Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915, 925 (D. Mass. 1958).
42
8Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1946); Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725-26
(6th Cir. 1942).
429 338 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1964).
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sanctioned the estimate of relevant figures by counsel because the more
orthodox use of expert testimony would have caused further expense, contrary to the purpose of the settlement to avoid costly litigation. Ordinarily,
also, the court will accept the unsworn statements of counsel regarding the
good faith of the settlement negotiations, but these may be subject to
cross-examination under oath if some basis for a charge of fraud is shown."
The Roles of the Parties. The submission of the settlement forces plaintiff's
counsel into an ambivalent position. An experienced judge has noted that,
"[i]n urging settlement, advocacy compels [plaintiff's counsel] to recognize the weaknesses of his case; but he must do so in a manner which will
not prove embarrassing to good advocacy in pushing forward with his case,
should the settlement collapse. Professional objectivity in a task of this
kind is not easily attained . . . ."" If plaintiff's lawyer extolls the virtues of
the action, his candor may be rewarded by rejection of the compromise."
If he deprecates them, he may be blamed for bringing a meritless suit, for
inadequate representation of the class, or for linking arms with the defendants. 3' Ideally plaintiff's lawyer should put forward his strongest case,
should note the obstacles to success which induced him to settle, but
should leave their elaboration to the defendants. The practice, however,
will often have to fall behind the model of perfection.
The defendant directors in a stockholder's action may face a different
dilemma. Does their fiduciary obligation of full disclosure require them to
come forward voluntarily with damaging evidence? In Alleghany Corp. v.
Kirby" the Second Circuit posed but did not resolve this question. The
court dealt with a collateral attack on a state court settlement; the defendants, it was charged, had defrauded the state court by knowingly
withholding an incriminating document. Judge Friendly affirmed the de3
fendants' fiduciary duty to produce the paper voluntarily," Judge Moore
3
rejected it, ' Judge Kaufman found it unnecessary to give an answer.4
Upon rehearing en banc the court was evenly divided, and the United
States Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, finally dismissed the writ
as improvidently granted." It may well be that the question thus left undecided will not arise again. Before a settlement involving fact issues re430 Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178, 179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
41' Armstrong v. Doyle, New York Law Journal, July 27, 1961, at 5, col.5 (Sup. Ct.), modified
and aff'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 916, 229 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1962); see Waterman Corp. v. Johnston, 106
N.Y.S.2d 813, 816 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1073, 113 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288,
appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 879, 109 N.E.2d 887 (1952).
.. Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 34 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582 (9th
Cir., July 29, 1968).
4' Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion), aff'd en
bane, 340 F.2d 311 (1965), cert. dismissed sub nor. Holt v. Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966).
484333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd en bane, 340 F.2d 311 (1965), cert. dismissed sub noma.
Holt v, Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966); Note, Corporations-Fraudon Court Approving
Derivative Suit Settlement Not Chargeable to Nonparticipating Director, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 97
(1964).
*s 333 F.2d at 338, 343, 346-47.
4 6
' 3 Id. at 334-35.
4
37Id. at 336.
438See note 434 supra.
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ceives judicial approval, the court should critically examine whether the
plaintiff has demanded the production of all important writings. The defendants will then have to produce the adverse evidence regardless of the
scope of their fiduciary obligations." Even in the absence of such a demand, the voluntary production of some documents by the defendants may
well imply a representation that they have exhibited all that is relevant;
in that case it is their duty to produce the bad along with the good. The
Alleghany question should arise, therefore, only in the unlikely case that
the settlement hearing completely ignores an important fact issue. In that
event it would seem unduly harsh to put all the blame on the defendants
when the plaintiff, the objectors and the court are equally at fault.
The Position of the Objector. The objector is not an interloper; he responds
to the invitation extended by the settlement notice to all members of the
class." One court has compared his role to that of a defendant summoned
by process of the court," 1 but he is a party only to the settlement proceedings, not to the action. The objector's position is thus a hybrid. His appearance is not tantamount to an intervention;"' accordingly, in a derivative suit, he need not have been a stockholder at the time of the wrong
complained of. ' Nor does he have to own any particular amount of
stock; even the smallest shareholder's opposition to the settlement is entitled to consideration." Occasional judicial remarks disparaging the small
interest of an objector would therefore seem beside the point." State statutes requiring derivative stockholder-plaintiffs to give security for the defendants' litigation expenses do not apply to objectors. If the court approves the compromise, the objector has an absolute right to appeal.'0 He
cannot, however, remove the settlement proceedings from the state to the
federal court."' If the settlement fails and the action proceeds, the objector
cannot participate without first obtaining leave to intervene; a successful
439 In the state court case reviewed in Alleghany, the plaintiffs as well as the objectors had demanded such a discovery (333 F.2d at 341). It is not too clear why the court did not treat the
demand as a sufficient basis for the defendants' duty to produce the critical document.
44oSee note 309 supra.
denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944).
441 Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
41 Id.; Lewis v. Rosenberg, '57-'61 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 90,856 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Hindman v. Owl Drug Co., 1 Cal. 2d 142, 33 P.2d 1023 (1934), adopted and republished, 4 Cal. 2d
451, 50 P.2d 438 (1935); General Inv. Corp. v. Warriner, 259 App. Div. 400, 19 N.Y.S.2d 566
(1940). But see Braun v. Fleming-Hall Tobacco Co., 33 Del. Ch. 246, 92 A.2d 302, 308 (Sup. Ct.
1952).
.. Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944);
Steigman v. Beery, 42 Del. Ch. 53, 203 A.2d 463, 467 (Ch. 1964).
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., '67-'69 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,315 (S.D.N.Y.
'Mutual
1968); Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811-12 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Waterman
Corp. v. Johnston, 106 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1072, 113
N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (1952), appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 879, 109 N.E.2d 887 (1952); Beeber v.
Empire Power Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 914, 917 (1941).
"0Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion), aff'd
en banc, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed sub nom. Holt v. Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S.
28 (1966). See also text accompanying notes 412-16 supra.
44 Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944);
Ackert v. Ausman, 217 F. Supp. 934, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Posen v. Cowdin, 267 App. Div. 158,
44 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1943).
T
4" Ackert v Ausman, 217 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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objector should have little difficulty in securing intervention if he can
meet the formal requirements. " '
The most important aspect of the objector's position is his right to be
heard and to gather and present evidence in opposition to the compromise.
This right, however, is subject to the discretionary control of the court.449
In exercising its discretion, the court aims at a hearing that is "something
less than a trial but more than a mere cursory treatment of the issues. '
Undue restriction of the objector's evidentiary rights might deprive the
court of vital information; undue indulgence may swell the hearing to
lengths that defeat the purpose of the settlement."' Keeping a proper
middle course is one of the more perplexing tasks of the settlement proceedings.
The objector-like most stockholder-plaintiffs-is usually without personal knowledge of the corporate transactions in dispute and has no independent evidence of his own to offer. The evidence secured by the plaintiff may be expected to support the settlement. The objector will try, therefore, to secure ammunition through his own interrogatories, depositions
and documentary discovery or by summoning the defendants as witnesses
before the court. At times he may be accorded these rights,4" at others
they may be denied or severely circumscribed,"" depending, it would seem,
in large measure on the amount and pertinence of the evidence adduced by
the proponents as well as a showing by the objector of a reasonable basis
for his evidentiary requests. If the proponents present a fairly complete
record, the objector's burden of demonstrating the need and wisdom of
further exploration will be heavy. Even if the proponents' prima facie
case is less thorough, the objector will rarely be permitted a roving fishing
expedition. 4" His right to investigate will be more readily sustained if he
confines himself to the cardinal issues and to a limited number of witnesses
and documents. He should probably not be required to make a formal
tender of proof,4 " but he ought to indicate with some specificity the kind
of facts he hopes to establish,"" for this will enable the court to balance the
value of the prospective evidence against the cost and burden of procuring
it. A factual investigation may be altogether dispensed with if the plain"'FED. R. Civ. P. 24; Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 562 (1960).
""Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944);
Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Rutman v. Kaminsky, 226 A.2d 122,
124 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1967); Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49, 56-57 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
4" Isaacs v. Forer, 39 Del. Ch. 105, 159 A.2d 295, 296 (Ch. 1960); see text accompanying
notes 370-75 supra.
"See Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 19 (E.D. Mich. 1950), aff'd sub nom. Masterson
v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953) (hearings were repeatedly adjourned for depositions, ran over 13 weeks, produced a 7000-page record). See also note
308 supra.
"'Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 19 (E.D. Mich. 1950), aff'd sub nom. Masterson v.
Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953); Forman v. Chesler,
39 Del. Ch. 484, 167 A.2d 442, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (objector was permitted to file interrogatories; Isaacs v. Forer, 39 Del. Ch. 105, 159 A.2d 295, 296 (Ch. 1960).
Schwartzman v. Tenneco Mfg. Co., 375 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1967); Glicken v. Bradford, 35
F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
454Rome v Archer, 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49, 56-57 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Spelfogel v. Baker,
New York Law Journal, Dec. 14, 1967, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
" But see Schwartzman v. Tenneco Mfg. Co., 375 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1967).
456 See note 453 supra.
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tiff's claim is open to legal doubts sufficiently grave to justify the settlement.
The objector's right to cross-examine the witnesses of the proponents
5 7 This should hold true even if
on relevant matters appears to be absolute."
their direct testimony is by affidavit, for cross-examination should not be
frustrated by keeping the witness out of court. " The extent of the crossexamination is, of course, under the court's control as upon a trial.
Since the objector has scant opportunity to prepare his opposition in advance of the hearing,4"' his request for a reasonable adjournment should
ordinarily be granted.'
On the whole, the roles of the objector and his counsel are not enviable,
and it is small wonder that many settlements meet with little or no opposition. Few objectors own enough stock to warrant the payment of cash
fees to their lawyers. Usually, therefore, the compensation of the objector's
lawyer is contingent on his success and depends on his ability to improve
the terms of the compromise." If despite his efforts the settlement is approved as proposed he receives nothing, for he is deemed to have conferred
no benefit on the class or corporation."' For the same reason, complete success-the outright rejection of the settlement-likewise leaves the objector's
lawyer without compensation; to earn a fee he would have to join in the
action and produce a recovery greater than the settlement he has helped
to defeat. His prospects of a reward for opposing the settlement are thus
meager, and the class members, however critical they may be of the settlement, do not easily find competent counsel to enter the lists, battle the united front of the proponents, and struggle with the court's natural tendency
to favor the compromise."' As a consequence, the adversary character of
many settlement hearings is weakened and the court is deprived of helpful
guidance.
This weakness of the settlement procedure might perhaps be remedied
by rendering the objector's part more attractive. The equity powers of the
court would seem broad enough to reward a particularly constructive and
meritorious opposition even if, despite the objections, the settlement is ultimately approved.4 " It is true that a stockholder-plaintiff can receive an
7
Wolf v. Nazareth Enterprises, Inc., 303 F.2d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1962); Pergament v.
Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 19 (E.D. Mich. 1950), aff'd sub nom. Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d
315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).
"9But see Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
4' See text accompanying notes 326-27 supra.
460Wolf v. Nazareth Enterprises, Inc., 303 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1962); Roman v. Master
Indus., Inc., '66-'67 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.. 5 91,806 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Glicken v. Bradford, 35
F.RD. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 19 (E.D. Mich. 1950),
aff'd sub norn. Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).
461 Green v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 326 F.2d 492, 498-99 (Ist Cir. 1964).
.. Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., No. 64 Civ. 3478 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 12, 1968, Wyatt, J.);
Roman v. Master Indus., Inc., '66-'67 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,806 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Grossman v. Playboy Clubs Int'l, Inc., No. 882,939 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Jan. 16, 1969,
at 12, Selber, J.); Waterman Corp. v. Johnston, 204 Misc. 587, 122 N.Y.S.2d 695, 700-01 (Sup.
Ct. 1953), modified, 283 App. Div. 743, 128 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1954). But see Silverstein v. Clarkson,
New York Law Journal, Nov. 25, 1949, at 1377, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.) (allowance granted where meritorious objection made possible more searching review of settlement, although only minor improvement of terms resulted).
4"See note 356 supra.
464 Silverstein v. Clarkson, New York Law Journal, Nov. 25, 1949, at 1377, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.);
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award only in the event of success, but the objector's position is signifi-

cantly different. The plaintiff proceeds on his own initiative, while the objector responds to the invitation of the court." Even an objection that is
finally overruled may contribute to a rounded presentation of the facts
and law and may assist the court in arriving at an informed decision. Since
the percentage allowed the plaintiff for producing a compromise is usually
less than what he would receive for success after a contest carried to the
bitter end,' there is some room for an award to the objector. Allowances
to unsuccessful opponents should, however, be the exception, not the rule,
and should be modest in amount, lest the settlement proceedings be smothered under a cloud of objectors." 7 Meritless, excessive or duplicatory objections ought not to be rewarded. The matter should rest in the sound discretion of the court, based on the real assistance it receives from the opponents to the compromise.
XI.

JUDGMENT AND APPEAL

If the settlement is approved, the form of the judgment does not markedly differ from the customary class suit judgment. It should recite that
the class members received due notice of the settlement and hearing; it
dismisses the corporate or class claims with prejudice and on the merits; its
other dispositive provisions will be similar to those frequently outlined in
the settlement stipulation."' Findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect to the settled claims do not seem necessary and may not even be
in order, for the settlement hearing is not a trial" 9 and the approval is based
on a balancing of likelihoods rather than an actual determination of the
facts and applicable law. While a statement of the reasons for approval is
desirable, its absence does not constitute a fatal defect, provided that the
record contains adequate evidence to support the decision."'
The judgment of approval normally terminates the action and is, therefore, appealable as a final decision.47' The approval of a partial settlement.'
can be appealed only if the court directs the entry of final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule 54 (b). The appeal may be taken by any aggrieved
party to the settlement proceeding, including the objectors."' The scope of
the appellate review is limited to abuse of discretion by the lower court,7 4
see Pergament v. Frazer, 132 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Mich. 1954), modified and aff'd, 224 F.2d 80
(6th Cir. 1955).
4 5
" See Green v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 326 F.2d 492, 499 (1st Cir. 1964).
461 Id. at 497.
4 7
1 In Grossman v. Playboy Clubs Int'l, Inc., No. 882,939 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County,
Jan. 16, 1969, at 8, 12, Selber, J.), the court noted that, with six objecting attorneys striving for
recognition, the settlement hearing seemed like a trial on the merits.
468 See text accompanying note 272 supra.
469 See note 372 supra. Federal Rule 52(a) prescribes findings of fact and conclusions
of law
only in connection with a trial or the grant or refusal of temporary injunctions. It declares them
unnecessary
on decisions of other motions.
4 0
1 Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 437 (1968).
47128 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964).
472 See note 214 supra.
473 See note 446 supra.
74
1
Ashbach v. Kirtley, 289 F.2d 159, 163 (8th Cir. 1961); Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606, 612
(2d Cir. 1946); In re Prudence Co., 98 F.2d 559, 560 (2d Cir. 1938); Rutman v. Kaminsky, 226
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errors of law,475 and procedural errors such as lack or inadequacy of the
class notice,4"' insufficient evidence 7 and undue restriction of the evidentiary rights of objectors. 8
If the court rejects the settlement, the propriety of an appeal is a more
difficult question. Since the order does not terminate the action, it is not
"final" in the traditional sense. In recent years, however, the requirement
of finality has been substantially relaxed. It is given a "practical rather
than a technical construction;" decisions called "collateral" are increasingly treated as appealable, particularly if their review at the end of the
litigation would be impractical.7 The rejection of a settlement may well
be deemed "collateral" to the main controversy; unless a prompt appeal
lies, the order can never be reviewed, for the rejection puts an end to the
compromise, 8" and it cannot be revived by an appeal from the final judgment in favor of one of the parties. These circumstances strongly support
an immediate appeal. There is little authority on the point,' but the
question may soon be resolved in an appeal presently pending before the
Ninth Circuit."'
XII.

THE EFFECTS OF THE APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT

Res Judicata. The judgment of approval constitutes res judicata of the
claims in suit and bars their further assertion in the same or any other
action. In a derivative case it binds the corporation and all its stockholders;.8 in a representative case it binds all members of the class except those
who have excluded themselves from the class pursuant to Federal Rule
A.2d 122 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1967); Kleinman v. Saminsky, 41 Del. Ch. 572, 200 A.2d 572 (Sup.
Ct.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964).
" Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1946); Brill v. Blakeley, 281 App. Div. 532, 120
N.Y.S.2d 713 (1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 951, 127 N.E.2d 96 (1955).
476 Pittston Co. v. Reeves, 263 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1959).
"' Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968); Ashbach v. Kirtley, 289 F.2d
159, 163-64 (8th Cir. 1961); Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 778 (1944).
478 Wolf v. Nazareth Enterprises, Inc., 303 F.2d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1962); Cohen v. Young,
127 F.2d 721, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944).
"' Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949); Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 952 n.8
(9th Cir. 1968) (with further citations).
48
°See p. 783 supra.
.. In Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), the district court rejected
a proposed settlement and denied an application to intervene; the per curiam affirmance, Piccard v.
Sperry Corp., 120 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1941), related only to the denial of intervention, as appears
from the papers on appeal. The New York state courts have entertained appeals from the rejection
of a settlement, Brill v. Blakeley, 308 N.Y. 951, 127 N.E.2d 96 (1955); Sorin v. Shahmoon, 7
App. Div. 2d 895, 182 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1959), but the finality rule does not apply in New York.
48
Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal pending, No. 23582 (9th
Cir., July 29, 1968).
483 Smith v. Alleghany Corp., 394 F.2d 381, 391 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 939 (1968);
Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 299 F.2d 449, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Stella v. Kaiser, 218
F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954), rehearing denied, 221 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835
(1955); Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168, 173 (D. Del. 1966); Dembitzer v. First
91,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Phillips v. Bradford,
Republic Corp., '64-'66 CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP.
228 F. Supp. 397, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Lifman v. Aronson, 42 Del. Ch. 46, 203 A.2d 252, 255
(Ch. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 42 Del. Ch. 367, 212 A.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Barroway
v. Reynolds, 40 Del. Ch. 124, 176 A.2d 850 (Ch. 1961); Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l
Sec. Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276 N.Y.S. 655, 657 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269
N.Y.S. 1007 (1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 525, 195 N.E. 183 (1935).
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23 (c) (2) .4 The effects of a derivative judgment may be reinforced by
releases."" If the settlement agreement and the judgment so provide, the
defenses of res judicata and release may also enure to persons other than
the defendants actually joining in the settlement.48 A derivative settlement
may bar the assertion of similar claims cast in a representative form." '
Prior to the 1966 amendment of Rule 23, it was highly doubtful whether
the judicially approved settlement of a spurious class suit.. could bind those
class members who were not parties to the action and did not accept the
settlement benefits.8 "' Nevertheless, for whatever it was worth, the judgment in cases of this kind often included a "bar order" precluding the
claims of all class members.'" With the abolition of spurious class suits in
1966, 4 1 the problem has disappeared in the federal courts. It persists in
those state jurisdictions which still do not recognize the class effect of
judgments in spurious class suits. New York seems to be in this category.""
Derivative and representative fraud actions are brought with increasing
frequency under the Securities Exchange Act of 19 34 .49s Since the 1934
Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction,494 it has become a recurrent
question whether the res judicata effect of a settlement of state claims in a
state court can bar the assertion of related Exchange Act claims. The answer depends, in the first place, on the "identity" of the state claims covered by the settlement with the federal claims sought to be barred. This, in
turn, calls for a comparison of the fraud concepts under the common law
and under the Exchange Act. Several courts have undertaken that comparison in various contexts and have reached divergent conclusions.49 The
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2), as amended.
" See text accompanying notes 206-11 supra.

486 See text accompanying notes 215-22 supra.

""Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966) (the court-approved settlement of a derivative suit attacking a corporate merger was held to bar a stockholders' representative
action complaining of the same merger).
...In "spurious" class suits under the old Rule 23 (a) (3), the character of the right sought to
be enforced for or against the class was several (rather than joint or common), there was a common 9 question of law or fact affecting the several rights, and a common relief was sought.
48 Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Cherner v. Transitron
Electronic
Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 53-54 (D. Mass. 1963).
4 99
Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Cherner v. Transitron
Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 53-54 (D. Mass. 1963); see Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp.
721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir, 1967).
41 See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 296-98 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969).
""Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
4. See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nora. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969);
Heit494v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
§ 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
495 Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1968) (a state claim for fiduciary
breach is not "the same" as a fraud claim under the Securities Exchange Act; a state-approved
settlement of the former is not res judicata of the latter). But see text accompanying notes 206-07
supra; Geller v. Bohen, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,429 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1969); Boothe v.
Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966) (state settlement of proxy fraud claim held res
judicata of Exchange Act claim for the same fraud); Dembitzer v. First Republic Corp., '64-'66
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (facts similar to Abramson v. Pennwood Inv.
Corp., supra; state court settlement held res judicata) ; see Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 969
n.6 (2d Cir. 1968) (dictum that dismissal of common law fraud claim bars claim under SEC
Rule 10b-5); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th
Cir. 1960) (contested dismissal of common law fraud claim by state court held res judicata of
corresponding claim under Rule Iob-5); Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 154 F. Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954)
(similar holding concerning proxy fraud claim); 5 L. Loss, SECURIrTms REGULATION 2978 (1969).
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law on the subject is still developing; a more detailed discussion would exceed the limits of this Article. One further point, however, should be
noted. In the antitrust field, in which federal jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp." held that treble damage claims
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts49 are altogether immune to the res
judicata impact of an adverse state court judgment. If, as has been suggested,49 the Lyons principle applies to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, it might well follow that a state court settlement could never operate
to bar claims under the 1934 Act, even though they are "the same" as the
state claims discharged by the compromise. The Lyons rule, however, is
based on the semi-penal nature of the antitrust treble damage sanction,
which must not be impeded by state action. The Securities Exchange Act
contains no comparable provisions, so that the rationale of Lyons appears
inapplicable.
Estoppel by Judgment. While res judicata bars the further assertion of an
adjudicated claim, collateral estoppel precludes the renewed contest of an
issue once it has been actually litigated and determined between the parties.'" According to two recent cases," fact findings concerning the claims
in suit made by the court in approving a stockholder settlement have the
force of collateral estoppel and bind all members of the class. This broad
application of the estoppel doctrine appears questionable. As previously
suggested, 0' the approval of a settlement does not call for findings of fact
regarding the claims to be compromised. The court is concerned only with
the likelihood of success or failure; the actual merits of the controversy are
not to be determined.'O The evidence is limited accordingly.Y The rules of
evidence are relaxed.'" The court listens to the advice and wishes of interested parties.' This is not the procedural stuff from which binding determinations of fact can be drawn. If the court, nevertheless, determines the
merits and the facts pertaining thereto, it goes beyond what is "distinctly
put in issue" by the settlement proceedings or what is "essential" to the
decision." Findings of this sort do not estop the parties,"" let alone the
absent members of the class.
496222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
49715 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
400 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 285 F. Supp. 61 (D. Del. 1968). See also Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279 F. Supp. 573, 579 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968) (rejecting the res judicata effect of a state judgment because of the exclusive federal jurisdiction of
Exchange Act claims); Block, Current Critical Points in Stockholder Litigation, 62 Nw. U.L. REV.
181, 198-202 (1967).
499Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-99 (1948); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94
U.S. 351 (1876); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68

(1942).

'5°Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968) (dictum); Boothe
v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168, 174 (D. Del. 1966). See also Auerbach v. Cities Serv. Co.,
36 Del. Ch. 554, 134 A.2d 846, 851 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
'91See text accompanying note 469 supra.
5o See note 373 supra.
503See note 374 supra.
504 See note 424 supra.
5 See text accompanying notes 398-422 supra.
"'SUnited States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 38 (1950); Southern Pac. R.R. v. United
States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49

"

(1897); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment o (1942).

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 38 (1950); Southern Pac. R.R. v. United
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This is not to say that the findings of the settlement court can never

give rise to a collateral estoppel. If an objector claims fraud or lack of
good faith in the settlement, the court must determine the truth of the
charge, not just its likelihood. The settlement court's findings on that issue,
reached after an actual and adversary contest, are binding on all class
members in any later proceeding.'
CollateralAttack on the Judgment. Federal Rule 60 (b) permits the court
which rendered a final judgment to grant relief therefrom for a variety of
reasons, including fraud, mistake and newly discovered evidence. Proceedings under this Rule concerning stockholder settlements seem to have
been rare. One instance, arising from the lack of the requisite class notice,
has been mentioned."°9 In another case, which predated the Federal Rules,
stockholders sought to intervene in the action, set aside the judgment and
settlement on the ground of fraud and proceed to trial; the court entertained the application but found that there had been no fraud."'
The procedure provided by Rule 60 (b) is not exclusive. Instead of moving under the Rule in the original action, interested parties may undertake a collateral attack on the settlement in another court. The grounds, as
will be seen, are substantially more limited than under Rule 60 (b). In most
of the reported cases, the complainants appealed to a federal court to upset
a state court settlement. Such attacks have taken several forms. The complaining party might bring an independent suit to enjoin or to rescind the
settlement,"' or he might prosecute an action on the claims covered by the
settlement and seek to forestall or overcome the plea of res judicata."'
These modes of procedure are not mutually inconsistent and may be combined. The substantive principles are the same in both. As a rule, the road
of the attacker is rocky and success is rare.
Federal injunctions against pending state settlement proceedings ordinarily fall under the ban of 28 U.S.C. section 2283."' Even apart from that
statute, an injunction would rarely, if ever, be justified. The complainant's
proper remedy is to present his objections to the settlement court. It is the
States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment o (1942). See
also Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 434, 182 A.2d 647 (Ch. 1962).
...Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1954), rehearing denied, 221 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955); Phillips v. Bradford, 228 F. Supp. 397, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
509 See note 334 supra.
""°Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). See also Campbell v. Railroad Co., 4 F.
Cas. 1178 (No. 2366) (E.D. Tex. 1871).
"..Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218- F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir.
1964), aff'd en banc, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed sub num. Holt v. Alleghany
Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966); Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd,
155 F.2d 773 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1946).
".. Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 299 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d
64, 65 (2d Cir. 1954), rehearingdenied, 221 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955);
Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966); Dembitzer v. First Republic Corp.,
'64-'66 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Phillips v. Bradford, 228 F. Supp. 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed,
No. 23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.), cert denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956); Ashley v. Keith
Oil Corp., 73 F. Supp. 37, 49, 54 (D. Mass. 1947).
"sBreswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed, No. 23661
(2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956). But see Reiter v. Universal
Marion Corp., 273 F.2d 820, 823-24 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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very purpose of a hearing on notice to the class to concentrate the settlement proceedings in a single forum, and it is not to be assumed that a
state court is less capable to render justice than a federal court."'
In Breswick &qCo. v. Briggs.' a federal court adopted a novel variant of
the injunction device. The plaintiff's in a stockholders' derivative action before the federal court asked it to enjoin settlement proceedings pending
in a New York state companion suit on the ground that the federal plaintiffs had been improperly excluded from the negotiation of the compromise."' The court refused to interfere with the state proceedings, but
enjoined the defendants from pleading the anticipated state court judgment, if it should approve the settlement, as res judicata in the federal
court. In strict contemplation of law, this "injunction" was probably no
more than a judicial announcement that the defense of res judicata, if and
when raised, would be overruled.' As a practical matter, the effect of the
order was hardly less drastic than an outright injunction, for the defendants could not be expected to pay the consideration for a settlement that
would not buy them peace. When the state court finally did approve the
compromise, it withheld the entry of judgment until the federal injunction was lifted," 8 and the leverage of the injunction enabled the federal
plaintiffs to secure a substantial increase of the compromise."'
The soundness of Breswick appears dubious for several reasons. The
court achieved by indirection what 28 U.S.C. section 2283 forbade to be
done directly. The anticipatory determination of the effects of a state
court judgment that might or might not be rendered at some future time
was premature; the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia so indicated in a later similar case."' Most important, the objection based on the
exclusion of the Breswick federal plaintiffs from the settlement negotiations
could and should have been presented to the state court; the state court so
held, 2' and the federal tribunal had no monopoly on insuring "procedural
decencies" and "fair treatment" to the litigants before it."' The Breswick
court thought that the plaintiffs should not be required to appear in the
state court because the state judgment would then preclude them, but a
class member duly notified of the settlement proceedings cannot escape res
judicata by remaining absent from the hearing."'
"' Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716, 719 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 773 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1946); see Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.,
348 U.S. 511, 518-19 (1955); Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two F.E. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952).
5 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed, No. 23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1955)
(mem.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 967 (1956); Comment, "Enjoining" Res Judicata, 65 YALE L.J.
543 (1956); Note, Federal Courts-Powers-Power of Federal Court To Enjoin Defendant from
Pleading State Court Judgment as Res Judicata in Federal Action, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1501 (1956).
518See note 176 supra.
5" The dismissal of the appeal (note 515 supra) indicates that the Second Circuit did not consider the decision as a genuine injunction appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1964).
018Zenn v. Anzalone, 17 Misc. 2d 897, 191 N.Y.S.2d 840, 844-45 (Sup. Ct. 1959), appeal dismissed, 11 App. Div. 2d 938, 210 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1960).
". Smith v. Alleghany Corp., 394 F.2d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 939
(1968).
2
' Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 273 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
"21.Zenn v. Anzalone, 1 App. Div. 2d 662, 146 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1955).
2
' 'See Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 404; 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed,
No. 23661 (2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956) (mem.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 697 (1956).
52 See notes 483, 484 supra.
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On what grounds, then, does a collateral attack on a judgment of approval lie? The Second Circuit has referred to "adequacy of notice and
representation" as necessary to bind the class." ' Constitutional due process
requires, indeed, that the settling plaintiff be an adequate class representative," it seems also to require due class notice of the settlement and hearing."' A judgment which fails to meet these constitutional standards is vulnerable to collateral impeachment. 27 In light of the presumption of regularity, the burden of proving the defect rests on the attacker. While these
general principles appear fairly clear, their application may raise questions
of some difficulty. May the adequacy of the class notice be collaterally
questioned by a stockholder who attended the hearing or knew of it?
Ashley v. Keith Oil Corp.2 ' seems to indicate a negative answer, but it
might be argued that, regardless of the standing of the complainant, the
court ought to protect the interests of the class members who were absent
and uninformed. Similarly, can a stockholder who received notice of the
hearing later on dispute the adequacy of the class representation? Phillips

v. Bradford2. held that he is precluded. That result was fair in the setting

of the case; since the complainant had impugned the good faith of the

settling stockholders from the outset, he should have raised his objections
at the settlement hearing. Normally, however, the class members should
be entitled to assume that the fundamental requirement of adequate representation is fulfilled; if the truth turns out to be otherwise, they ought

to be able to raise the point in a collateral proceeding.
Fraud is the ground most frequently invoked to sustain a collateral attack. According to a traditional distinction, "extrinsic" rather than "intrinsic" fraud is necessary to impeach a judgment,"' but the importance of
this conceptual refinement seems to be weakened by the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between the parties to the original action."' In Reiter
v. Universal Marion Corp.32 the federal court rejected an attack on a New

York state court settlement because the alleged withholding of evidence in
the settlement proceedings was intrinsic fraud under the applicable New
5124Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1954), rehearing denied, 221 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955); Smith v. Alleghany Corp., 394 F.2d 381, 391 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 939 (1968).
525 See text accompanying notes 157-62 supra.
526 See note 333 supra.
...Geller v. Bohen, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,429 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1969), suggests that
a representative class suit settlement, approved on notice to the registered stockholders only, does
not bar an unregistered stockholder. Ashley v. Keith Oil Corp., 73 F. Supp. 37, 49, 51, 54 (D.
Mass. 1947), involved two successive derivative suits on the same cause by different stockholders.
The court-approved settlement of the first suit was held not to be res judicata in the second because
no class notice had been given; but the court found the settlement fair and sustained it as a defense
to the second suit. Somewhat inconsistently, this determination was again made without notice to
the class.
55273 F. Supp. 37, 54 (D. Mass. 1947).
5"' 228 F. Supp. 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
550 This somewhat hazy distinction goes back to United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61,
65-66, 68-69 (1878). See 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 60.37 (2d ed. 1968). A fraud directly
operating on the court, such as perjured testimony or a forged instrument, is "intrinsic." A fraud
directed at the unsuccessful party, as where a lawyer sells out his client's interest, is "extrinsic."
Only the latter type of fraud is said to support a collateral attack on the judgment.
...7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 60.37[l], at 611 (2d ed. 1968).
'3'299 F.2d 449, 453-54 (D.C. Cir, 1962),
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York rule; 3 nevertheless, the federal court undertook "the most careful
scrutiny of the record" to discover possible "skulduggery."5 4 Alleghany
Corp. v. Kirby... was another unsuccessful attempt to upset a New York
state court settlement on the ground of evidence fraudulently withheld."
The district court rested its decision on the "intrinsic" nature of the
fraud;55 the Second Circuit, paying scant attention to this reason, affirmed
mainly because it was not "probable" that the suppressed evidence would
have led to a different decision by the state court." 8 Had the evidence been
more significant, the settlement would apparently have been struck down
even though the defendant before the federal court had not participated
in the concealment perpetrated upon the state court by other fiduciary defendants. 5 Other types of undisclosed misconduct-such as the acceptance
of a secret bribe by the stockholder-plaintiff or his consultant-may likewise support a collateral attack on the judgment."
Fraud which does not amount to deception or concealment affords no
basis for collateral impeachment of the judgment. In Feldman v. Pennroad
Corp."' the federal court sustained as res judicata a state court settlement
alleged to have been fraudulently negotiated by dominated directors at an
inadequate price; the charges of fraud, domination and inadequacy had
been considered and overruled by the state court. In Stella v. Kaiser"' the
Second Circuit rejected an attack on a settlement approved by another federal court; although the defendants in the original action had withheld
relevant evidence during the negotiation of the compromise, the facts were
fully revealed in the course of the settlement hearings. 43 The mere improvidence or inadequacy of a court-approved compromise is, of course, no
ground to upset it in a collateral proceeding.'"
XIII.

THE OUT-OF-COURT SETTLEMENT

In Wolf v. Bark-es' the Second Circuit held that, despite Rule 23, a corporation on whose behalf a derivative action is brought may enter into an
"'That this was the ground of the court's decision appears from the New York cases it
cited.
5 4 Id. at 453.
1 Id. at 454.
5"'218 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd en banc, 340
F.2d 311 (1965), cert. dismissed sub noa. Holt v. Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966); Note,
Fraud on Court Approving Derivative Suit Settlement Not Chargeable to NonparticipatingDirector,
33 FORDHAM L. REv. 97 (1964).
'3 See text accompanying notes 434-38 supra.
537 218 F. Supp. at 183-85.

5"333 F.2d at 334, 337-38. Judge Friendly's dissenting opinion held that a "possible" impact
of the suppressed document on the state court's decision should be enough to upset the state court
judgment. Id. at 343-44.
" This was the view of Judges Kaufman and Friendly (333 F.2d at 336-37, 338-39). Judge
Moore disagreed (333 F.2d at 336).
54 5
Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164, 175-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aft'd, 333 F.2d 327
(2d Cir. 1964), aff'd en banc, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed sub norm. Holt v.
Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966).
5" 155 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947).
542 218 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1954), rehearing denied, 221 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 835 (1955).
"'See Masterson

v. Pergament,

203 F.2d

315, 330

(6th

Cir.),

(1953).
5
"Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
5 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965).

cert. denied, 346

U.S.
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out-of-court settlement of the claims in suit without consulting the plaintiff, the court or the class." The case arose upon an application by the derivative plaintiff to enjoin the corporation's settlement with the defendants unless it was approved by the court on notice to all stockholders. The
denial of the injunction by the district court might well have been sustained on the narrow ground, invoked by the concurring opinion of Judge

Waterman,4 7 that there was no threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff
since his action could not be dismissed until the compromise was pleaded
as a defense. The majority of the court, however, placed its decision on a
broader basis. Judge Friendly's thoughtful opinion reasoned that, so long as
no derivative action is brought, a corporation certainly is entitled to settle
its claims as it sees fit," 's subject only to normal shareholder redress for
fraud, waste or self-dealing. 49 The institution of a derivative suit, he held,
does not curtail this substantive corporate power, for Rule 23, properly
construed in light of its language and purpose, is not intended to abolish
the corporation's right to enter into an out-of-court compromise, and the
Supreme Court's rule-making power under the Enabling Act.. is not broad
enough to impose such a restriction on the corporation.
The Second Circuit's narrow interpretation of Rule 23 is hard to accept.
The court observed that the Rule, read literally, governs only the settlement of a class suit and does not, therefore, apply to an out-of-court compromise of the derivative claims.55' This distinction, tenuous at best, disappears altogether once the out-of-court settlement is tendered to the court as
a defense to the action, as it must be in order to have practical effect. Surely
a motion to dismiss the class suit on the strength of the compromise comes
within the strict letter of the Rule. " Nor is the exclusion of the stockholder-plaintiff from the compromise a ground to dispense with Rule 23.? 5
While the corporation as the owner of the claim is always a necessary party
to a derivative settlement agreement, the plaintiff is not. 54 If he joins in the
54 Accord, Adler v. Brooks, 375 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Contra, Standard Home
& Sav. Ass'n v. Pratt, 64 Ohio St. 147, 59 N.E. 855 (1901). See Comment, Compromise of Derivative Claim by a Corporation Without Court Approval, 52 VA. L. REv. 342 (1966); Note, Federal
Courts-Rules of Civil Procedure-Rule 23(c) Does Not Prevent Out-of-Court Settlement by
Corporation of Claims That Are the Subject of a Stockholder's Derivative Suit, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1526 (1966).
47 Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941
(1965).
5SCutter v. Arlington Casket Co., 255 Mass. 52, 151 N.E. 167 (1926) (bona fide settlement
of corporation's suit against its former director bars subsequent stockholder's derivative action);
see Post v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 200 F. 918 (8th Cir. 1912); Heimann v. American Express
Co., 53 Misc. 2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1967); 2 W. FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 528
(M. Wolf & E. Comiskey rev. ed. 1969).
.. Gluck v. Unger, 25 Misc. 2d 554, 202 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
55048 Stat. 1064 (1934), now 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
55' 348 F.2d at 996.
"'This is confirmed by the court's own authority, Webster Eisenlohr v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d
316, 320 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945). The class plaintiffs there had sold
their stock to the defendants and had thereby disabled themselves from further prosecuting the
action. The Third Circuit forbade the district court to investigate the transaction, but ruled that
the action could not be dismissed without notice to the class pursuant to Rule 23. By analogy, the
mere conclusion of the out-of-court settlement in Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965), did not call for the intercession of the court; but any attempt to
dismiss the Wolf action on the basis of the compromise would have brought Rule 23 into play.
See Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at notes 68, 104.
55sContra, Adler v. Brooks, 375 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
5, See note 184 supra.
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agreement, his approval tends to confirm the fairness of the settlement; if
the agreement is concluded over his head, the compromise is liable to be
suspect. It would seem paradoxical to insist on the safeguards of court approval and class notice in the former case but not in the latter.
The court's analysis of the purpose of Rule 23 appears hardly more persuasive. It is quite true, as the court noted, that the Rule was primarily designed to prevent private settlements paid to the stockholder-plaintiff
without any benefit to the corporation,"' and that the Wolf settlement was
not "private" in this sense. It is equally true, however, that in the thirty
years since its adoption Rule 23 has never been limited just to the prevention of private settlements. An unbroken line of authorities under the
Rule has required class notice and court approval of derivative compromises
whose benefits enured wholly to the corporation. In all these cases the corporation was, of necessity, a party to the settlement. It is difficult to believe
that the parties could have evaded the broad sweep and beneficial purpose
of the Rule by the facile formalism of entering into the settlement "out of
court" and then presenting it to the court as a defense to the action. Once
a settlement is thus put before the court, the Rule plainly prescribes class
notice and discretionary judicial evaluation of the compromise."'
In cases of exceptional urgency, it may be desirable to consummate the
settlement ahead of its submission to the court and class, but that is no
ground to dispense with class notice and court approval altogether. If the
parties choose, they are free to carry out the compromise before submitting it to the court." ' If they do, they run the chance of ultimate judicial
disapproval and, hence, of reinstatement of the claims in litigation, but
this risk is the price of speed. Even on the theory of the Wolf case, a fully
consummated out-of-court settlement may still be vulnerable to charges of
fraud, waste or self-dealing. It ought to be equally vulnerable to the test
of fairness, for that is the test laid down by Rule 23, and the requirement
of fairness ought not to be sacrificed in the interest of expedition or convenience.
It is a different question whether the corporation's power to settle its
claims as it sees fit can be restricted by a procedural rule. The Enabling
Act". provides that the Rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right, but a rule relating merely to the manner and means for the
5" See Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at 770-71.
5"6 The Wolf court did note (348 F.2d at 997-98) two earlier derivative cases in which settlements negotiated by an independent board of directors had, nevertheless, been processed under
Rule 23. Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 141 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739
(1944); Birnbaum v. Birrell, 17 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). To reconcile these authorities with
his decision, Judge Friendly suggested that the settling parties in the two cases had voluntarily elected
to proceed under the Rule but would have been free to ignore it (348 F.2d at 997-98). The assumption of such a right of election does not, however, seem consonant with the mandatory language of the Rule that the class suit "shall not" be compromised without court approval and that
notice of the compromise "shall be" given to the stockholders. Nor does it appear, as the court
suggested (id.), that a defendant has "much to gain" by following Rule 23; a dismissal of the
action based on the out-of-court settlement would be res judicata and would bind the class no less
than a dismissal under Rule 23.
557See note 266 supra, and accompanying text for illustrative examples of settlements wholly
or partly consummated in advance of court approval.
"SSSee note 550 supra.
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enforcement of a right does not run afoul of this provision."' It may well
be argued that the judicial supervision of derivative settlements under Rule
23 pertains to the manner and means of enforcing the corporate rights.
The Supreme Court, we are told, " °' exercised "great vigilance" in observing the statutory limitations of its rule-making power. Its adoption of
Rule 23 thus lends strong support to the validity of the Rule as written,
and this conclusion gains added force from the approval of the Rule by
Congress."' In the view here taken, therefore, Rule 23 validly prescribes
class notice and court approval for every settlement, reached in whatever
form and by whatever means, which is placed before the court in order to
dispose of a derivative suit and the claims alleged therein.
XIV. THE PRIVATE SETTLEMENT
"Private settlement" is a polite term for a buy-off: the class plaintiff or
his lawyer is paid to drop his suit or to abandon its prosecution-the class
or corporation gets nothing. As previously shown, this practice enjoyed judicial sanction for a long time; its adverse effects on the class or corporation
furnished a major stimulus for the adoption of Rule 23 (c)."' Private settlements should, therefore, never receive court approval under the Rule,
and leave to dismiss a class suit should be denied if the dismissal is accompanied by an unearned payment to the plaintiff or his counsel. " '
As a tool for the prevention of private settlements, Rule 23 is less than
perfect. The request for leave to dismiss a class action might not reveal
the private payment," ' or the recipient might simply permit the action to
wither on the vine." ' Even if the court learns of the private settlement, it
can do nothing about it until a dismissal of the action is sought. 6 '
A more effective safeguard of the class rights has been developed by the
courts without regard to the Rule. Under familiar principles, a fiduciary
must not derive personal gain from the use of his powers; if he does he is
accountable to his cestuis.'" Since a class plaintiff and his counsel are fiduciaries,5" their profits from a private settlement are impressed with a con5" Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946); 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 5 0.501[3], at 5031 (2d ed. 1965); see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
5002 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrICE 5 1.04[1], at 215 (2d ed. 1967), quoted (from an earlier
edition) in Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965).
"' Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1941).
5'See Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at 768-71.
"a Fistel v. Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see Whitten v. Dabney, 171
Cal. 621, 154 P. 312 (1915); Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at 784.
""But see DEL. CH. CT. R. 23, referred to in Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at note 71.
0' See Part I of this Article, supra note 153, at 776-78.
.66Webster Eisenlohr v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1944), cert.denied, 325 U.S. 867
(1945); see Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 94-95 (D. Conn. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1960). See also Part I of this
Article, supra note 153, at note 104, and accompanying text.
67 Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 381 F.2d 646, 650-52 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822
(1967); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109 F.2d 543, 545-46 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 665 (1940); Heit v.
Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217, 225-26 (E.D. Mo. 1967); White v. Sherman, 168 IlI. 589, 611, 48
N.E. 128, 130 (1897); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78,
81 (1969);.RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, comment (e), § 197, comment (c) (1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

O5 TRUSTS

508See note 156 supra.

§§ 203, 205

(1959).
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structive trust and may be recovered at the suit of the corporation or any
member of the class."6
The fountainhead of this doctrine is the Supreme Court's decision in
Young v. Higbee Co. 7 ' In a corporate bankruptcy reorganization, two preferred shareholders appealed from the district court's order approving the
plan because it failed to subordinate a debt claim to the rights of the preferred class. While the appeal was pending they sold their stock, for a multiple of its value, to the owners of the debt and dismissed their appeal.
Upon the petition of another preferred shareholder, who had unsuccessfully sought to intervene in the appeal and to prevent its dismissal, the Supreme Court held the former appellants liable to the preferred class for the
excess of what they had received for their stock over its value. 7' By availing themselves of the privilege of litigating for a class, the two preferred
shareholders had assumed the duty to represent the common rights fairly
and in good faith and to refrain from trading in the rights of others for
their own benefit. The judicially approved dismissal of the appeal and the
denial of the petitioner's intervention were held to be no obstacles to the
recovery .'Although the Supreme Court's decision rested in part on bankruptcy principles, its application to conventional class suits, derivative or
representative, was suggested by the Court. 7 and is now beyond doubt."s 4
It is no defense to the private settlor's liability that his action or appeal
would have failed in any event. It is true that the class suffers no injury
from the surrender of an unfounded claim, but a wrongdoing fiduciary is
accountable for his profits regardless of the absence of loss or injury to his
beneficiary.' In Young v. Higbee Co. the Supreme Court did not even
raise the question whether the abandoned appeal could have been successful. " 6 In a later case, a derivative plaintiff's lawyer accepted a fee from
the defendant director for acquiescing in the latter's motion for summary
judgment; he was held liable for the fee although resistance to the motion
would have been hopeless."
The primary liability for a private settlement rests on the recipient. One
59 Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945); Dabney v. Levy, 191 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951); Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Topping, 171 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1948);
Young v. Potts, 161 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1947); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 281-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947); Note, Accountability of One Settling a Stockholder's Suit, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 564 (1947).
5703 2 4 U.S. 204 (1945).
'7"Value,"
it was held in a sequel to the case, means market value; Young v. Potts, 161 F.2d

597, 599-600 (6th Cir. 1947).
.7 For the procedural complexities which may arise from the judicial dismissal of a class suit
following a private settlement, compare the conflicting decisions in Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F.
Supp. 255, 281-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), and Sonnenschein v. Evans, 21 N.Y.2d 563, 236 N.E.2d 846,
289 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1968).
'5See the Court's reference, 324 U.S. at 204 n.10, to articles by McLaughlin and Hornstein
dealing with "the same general topic," i.e., stockholders' private settlements.
...Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Topping, 171 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1948); Miller v. Steinbach,
268 F. Supp. 255, 281-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Craftsman Fin. & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp.
168, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (dictum).
"'See authorities cited in note 567 supra.
"'This was noted in Parlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 177 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 952 (1955).
'77Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Topping, 171 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1948). But see Waterman
Corp. v. Johnston, 275 App. Div. 106, 87 N.Y.S.2d 467, 469 (1949).
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who shares in the proceeds with notice of their origin is likewise accountable. 7 ' Liability should also attach to the persons who pay the private settlement or cause it to be paid. This is certainly true if a derivative plaintiff is paid out of funds of the beneficiary corporation; the use of corporate
moneys to frustrate a claim of the corporation is a conversion,579 for which
the responsible directors and officers can be held to account. Even if the
defendants expend their own funds for the buy-off, they should be liable
jointly and severally with the recipient,"' for a person who knowingly participates with a fiduciary in a breach of his duty is liable along with him.'81
A stockholder who secures a buy-off by merely threatening to bring a
class suit should be no less liable than one who has actually started an
action; 582 the two cases are not significantly different. If a stockholder procures payment to the class or corporation without litigation he is, in appropriate circumstances, entitled to compensation out of the recovery. " '
By the same token, a stockholder should not be permitted to keep the fruits
of a private settlement obtained through the non-litigative use of a power
conferred on him by law for the benefit of the entire class. A stockholder
who objects, or threatens to object, to the judicial approval of a proposed
class settlement likewise exercises a class right and should be barred from
accepting a buy-off.
The amount of the liability includes interest from the date of the receipt
of the pay-off. '"4 As a rule, the recipient cannot deduct his litigation expenses, " ' but in extraordinary circumstances the court may treat the private settlement as a corporate recovery and grant from it a reasonable fee
to the plaintiff's lawyer. "'
Since the acceptance of a private settlement is a breach of fiduciary duty,
it might be suggested that the recipient is liable not only for his profit but
also for the damages inflicted on the class or corporation. The amount of
the damages might be substantial if the private settlement should result in
the loss of the class claim, for instance through the operation of the statute
of limitations. No court, however, has exacted such an extreme sanction,
and there are grounds for not imposing it. To say that a class plaintiff is a
fiduciary does not define the nature and extent of his duties. "8 ' They should
be fashioned so as to deter abuse, but without subjecting the class plaintiff
to risks and burdens so heavy as to discourage him altogether from championing the class rights. A stockholder's action is always difficult; the addition of a huge potential liability for failure to carry through might tip the
"78Dabney v. Levy, 191 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951).
579 id.
5"Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 281-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Contra, Waterman Corp.
v. Johnston, 275 App. Div. 106, 87 N.Y.S.2d 467, 469 (1949).
...Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921); Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 125
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 709 (1934).
' Note, Corporations-DrivativeSuits-Plaintiff Required To Account to Corporation for
Proceeds of Settlement, 14 U. CHi. L. REv. 673, 675 (1947).
5SSee Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968) (short-swing profits under
Securities
Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964)).
84
5 Dabney v. Levy, 191 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951).
5''Young v. Potts, 161 F.2d 597, 599-600 (6th Cir. 1947).
..7 Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Topping, 171 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1948).
58 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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scales against ever bringing the suit. Moreover, the danger that the private
settlement will cause the loss of the class rights should not be exaggerated.
If one class member has been bought off, another may reopen the action.8
or, if that be impossible," 9 bring a new one. Even if in the meantime the
statute of limitations has run, the defendant who has paid the private settlement may well be estopped by his inequitable conduct from raising the
defense.
In the last fifteen years, very few private settlements have come to the
attention of the courts. Some instances may have remained undiscovered,
but the former prevalence of the practice seems to have been broken. The
prevention of private settlements, one of the major aims of Rule 23, has
thus been substantially achieved. The positive accomplishments of the
Rule are likewise notable. It guards against the undue sacrifice of class
rights; it protects the defendants by the res judicata effects of a final
judgment; it facilitates the relief of the court and parties from lengthy
and difficult litigation; its procedure is fairly simple and the expense not
unreasonable. Other aspects of class litigation have been involved in lively
controversy, but little of it has reached the subjects of settlement and dismissal. Such improvements in practical detail as have been here suggested
can readily be achieved within the framework of the Rule.

588 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see Pittston Co. v. Reeves, 263 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1959).

..Manufacturers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson, 176 Misc. 220, 25 N.Y.S.2d 502, 508-09 (Sup.
Ct. 1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 731, 29 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 668, 43 N.E.2d
71 (1942). Although the principle of this decision was reaffirmed by dictum in Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 149, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947), it may now be superseded by N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 1963).

